Why do defaults affect behavior? Experimental evidence from Afghanistan by Blumenstock, Joshua et al.
Why do defaults affect behavior? Experimental evidence from 
Afghanistan
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102899/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Callen, Mike, Blumenstock, Joshua and Ghani, Tarek (2019) Why do defaults 
affect behavior? Experimental evidence from Afghanistan. American Economic 
Review. ISSN 0002-8282 (In Press) 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
Why Do Defaults Affect Behavior?
Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan∗
Joshua Blumenstock†
U.C. Berkeley
Michael Callen‡
U.C. San Diego, NBER
Tarek Ghani§
Washington University
July 8, 2017
Abstract
We report on an experiment examining why default options impact behavior. Working
with one of the largest private firms in Afghanistan, we randomly assigned each of 949
employees to different variants of a new default savings account. Employees assigned
a default contribution rate of 5% are 40 percentage points more likely to contribute
than employees assigned to a default contribution rate of zero; to achieve this effect
through financial incentives alone would require a 50% match from the employer. Our
design permits us to rule out several common explanations for default effects, includ-
ing employer endorsement, employee inattention, and a lack of awareness about how
to switch. Instead, we find evidence that the default effect is driven largely by a com-
bination of present-biased preferences and the cognitive cost of calculating alternate
savings scenarios. Default assignment also causes employees to develop savings habits
that outlive our experiment: they are more likely to believe that savings is important,
less likely to report being too financially constrained to save, and more likely to make
an active decision to save at the end of our trial.
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1 Introduction
Default options often substantially impact behavior. Indeed, this observation is among the
most influential and policy relevant insights from behavioral economics (Madrian, 2014).
From organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Abadie and Gay, 2006), to vaccine use
(Chapman et al., 2010), and especially in the domain of retirement savings decisions (Madrian
and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2004; Beshears et al., 2009; Carroll et al., 2009; Chetty et al.,
2014), individuals tend to remain at their default assignment. Yet, particularly as relates to
retirement savings, economists still have an incomplete understanding of why defaults work.
This paper reports results from a field exeriment designed to study the impact of default
savings assignments and to more precisely identify the reasons why defaults affect behavior.
For the experiment, we worked with Afghanistan’s largest mobile phone operator to design
and evaluate a new phone-based savings account, called “M-Pasandaz.”1 The study took
part in two phases. In the first, each of 949 employees was randomly assigned to have either
0% or 5% of his or her salary automatically deducted and placed into a savings account. Sep-
arately, each employee was randomly assigned a financial incentive to save, with one third
of employees receiving a 50% match on all contributions; one third receiving a 25% match;
and the final third receiving no financial incentives. This phase makes it possible to com-
pare the effect of ‘nudging’ employees with defaults and of incentivizing them with matching
contributions, and to experimentally estimate how defaults affect employee decisions and
behavior. In the second phase of the study, we implemented a series of interventions de-
signed to unstick employees from their default assignment, and experimentally test several
prominent explanations for default effects discussed in the literature.
The first phase of the study produces three basic results. First, default assignments have
large and significant impacts on employee participation and savings, of comparable magni-
tude to what is reported in the U.S. literature (Appendix Table A1). Two months after the
launch of the product and after almost all switching of contribution rates had ceased, em-
1“Pasandaz” means savings in Dari, the most common language spoken in Afghanistan.
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ployees randomly assigned a default contribution rate of 5 percent were 40 percentage points
more likely to contribute to the account than individuals assigned a default contribution rate
of zero. Notably, increased savings in M-Pasandaz were not offset by reductions in other
savings instruments. We collected several rounds of follow-up surveys with each employee
and find that, if anything, participating in M-Pasandaz may have crowded in other savings.
While the literature has speculated that savings arising from defaulting employees into plans
reflects new savings, ours is the first, to our knowledge, to confirm this with longitudinal
surveys designed to capture each employee’s full financial portfolio.
Second, we “price” the default relative to matching contributions, and estimate the elas-
ticity of participation with respect to financial incentives. While a substantial body of re-
search suggests that savings programs that incorporate default contributions are more likely
to increase participation than programs that rely on monetary incentives alone (Chetty et
al., 2014; Madrian, 2013), to our knowledge this is the first study to experimentally com-
pare default and incentive effects on a single population. We find that default assignment
increases participation by roughly the same amount as a 50% match on employee contribu-
tions. We further find that the elasticity of participation with respect to the match rate is
about one, independent of default status.
Third, we find evidence that the default affects employee attitudes and habits, and that
these effects persist long after the experiment ends. Most notably, we removed all financial
incentives to contribute at the end of a six-month trial, and asked each employee to make
an active decision about whether to continue to contribute. Even absent incentives, 45% of
employees elected to contribute, with participation 25% higher in the group that was ran-
domly assigned a positive default contribution rate at the beginning of the trial. Two years
later, savings balances were still higher for those defaulted into savings. This persistence ap-
pears to be driven in part by shifting employee’s perceived liquidity constraint, as employees
randomly assigned a positive default contribution rate were less likely to report being too
financially constrained to save. Default assignment similarly increased employees’ long-term
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interest in saving and their overall sense of financial security. Such evidence is consistent
with the idea that employees might form habits through the experience of saving (Becker
and Murphy, 1988; Charness and Gneezy, 2009), perhaps through better financial planning
(Thaler, 1999; Schaner, 2016). More broadly, these results can inform the larger discussion
of whether using defaults to change financial behavior is welfare improving by suggesting
that under certain conditions a default assignment can cause employees to learn about the
costs and benefits of saving (Bernheim et al., 2015).
The rest of the paper explores why default assignment has such large impact on savings.
The literature offers four sets of explanations; two are consistent with rational models and
two with behavioral models.2 First, defaults may persist because of an ‘employer endorse-
ment’ effect whereby decisionmakers, unsure of the best course of action, take the default
as reflecting a recommendation by a benevolent planner (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et
al., 2004; Madrian, 2014). Second, there may be significant real or perceived costs involved
in switching from the default election, either due to frictions in changing the election or to
the complexity of forming a financial plan (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011; Cole et al., 2011;
Drexler et al., 2014). Third, turning to behavioral theories, employees may be unaware of
their election, or the possibility of switching may not be salient in their minds (Karlan et al.,
2016b; Taubinsky, 2013; Kast et al., 2016). In this case, individuals simply have not acquired
the information necessary to change their election. Fourth, and related, because changing
defaults involves some immediate costs with delayed benefits, individuals may not switch,
particularly if they are present-biased and naive about their future preferences (O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 1999).
Our data contradict the first two explanations for why defaults affect behavior. First,
our research design eliminates ‘employer endorsement’ effects by construction: the open
lottery used to assign default status and matching incentives makes clear to employees that
assignments do not reflect the deliberation of a benevolent planner, and this understanding
2Madrian (2013) and Beshears et al. (2009) provide reviews.
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is clearly visible in follow-up surveys with employees.3 We also see little evidence that the
“default in” assigned rate of 5% was perceived as optimal – only 8 of 447 employees (1.8%)
actively chose to contribute at 5% (most people who opted in did so at the maximum of
10%). Second, every effort was made to mimize the transactional costs involved in switching.
For instance, to change their contribution rate, employees simply needed to let someone from
their human resources department know – this could be done in person, via a phone call, or
by sending an email or text message. Our survey data indicate that employees were clearly
aware of their contribution level and knew how to change it if they wanted to.4
Our results therefore suggest that the reasons defaults affect behavior are better char-
acterized using a behavioral model. Here, however, we find little evidence that limited
attention is a significant barrier to switching from the default election. In particular, we
implemented three separate interventions designed to increase the salience of the default
assignment (including a series of randomly-assigned SMS reminders and financial surveys),
and none of these resulted in significant switching. The strongest evidence we can find of
inattention occurred three weeks into the study on the first payday, when 22 of our 943 par-
ticipants (2.33%) switched their contribution, which was a modest increase over the number
of switches on previous days. Thus, while limited attention clearly affects savings decisions
in other contexts and plays a small role here, very large default effects persist even after
several interventions are deployed to increase the salience of the default.
By contrast, there is much in our data to suggest that default effects in savings persist
because employees face significant cognitive costs associated with doing the math neces-
sary to choose an optimal contribution rate, and that this cost interacts with present-biased
preferences. The role of present bias is suggested in heterogeneous response to the default:
375% of the 838 employees contacted in the face-to-face endline survey confirmed their belief that the
assignment of matching incentives was random, while 14% indicated they did not think it was truly random,
and 11% indicated that they were unsure. In focus groups, employees expressed gratitude and surprise at
observing the truly random assignment of incentives, since past promotions and bonuses had created an
expectation of favoritism and nepotism.
4For instance, 87% of employees report fully understanding how the product works, and 96% of partici-
pants were aware of their match rate.
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employees who exhibited present bias in both hypothetical and incentivized behavioral elici-
tations were significantly more likely to remain at their default assignment (even controlling
for their long run discount factor and a broad set of observables). Further, of the experi-
mental interventions we implemented – all of which were designed to encourage employees
to choose a non-default contribution rate – the only one that proved effective was to pro-
vide employees with a thorough financial consultation. The consultation consisted of several
modules, and the component that stands out as most associated with switching is one that
walks them through the math of hypothetical savings scenarios. We directly observe the
interaction between present bias and the cognitive cost through a final experiment in which
we randomize between subjects whether the financial consultation would commence imme-
diately, or would happen with a one week delay. Employees who exhibit present bias in the
incentivized preference measurement task are more likely to accept the consultation with a
delay than when it is offered immediately. In other words, present-biased employees, who
are already less likely to switch from their default election, are also more likely to delay
undertaking an activity that involves the immediate cost of determining a financial plan.
Lastly, we use a novel empirical approach to test for peer effects in the decision to save.
This help us address concerns that employees might have behaved strategically, and relates to
a broader literature on peer effects in financial decisions (cf. Duflo and Saez, 2003; Banerjee
et al., 2013; Bursztyn et al., 2014; Beshears et al., 2015). Specifically, we obtained from
the mobile phone operator transaction records covering the universe of mobile phone calls
made and received by employees at the firm. These data make it possible to quantify the
extent to which each employee is connected to other employees who are more likely to save.
Since employees’ friends are also randomly assigned default rates and matching incentives,
this means some people have social networks where rates of saving are exogenously larger.
However, under a variety of plausible definitions of what consititutes a “social contact,” we
find little evidence that employees’ financial decisions are influenced by the savings decisions
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of their peers.5
To summarize, this paper makes several contributions relative to existing research on the
impact of default assignment on savings behaviors. First, we provide the first experimental
evaluation of a default payroll contribution account, and show that experimental estimates
of the default effect in a developing country are comparable to quasi-experimental estimates
from the U.S. and western Europe. Second, our carefully controlled environment makes it
possible to answer important and outstanding questions about default effects, including the
‘price’ of the default relative to financial incentives, how defaults affect the entire savings
portfolio, and how defaults impact attitudes toward savings and future active savings deci-
sions. Finally, our design allows substantial exploration of the mechanisms underlying the
default, which together highlight the cognitive cost of making financial decisions and the role
of present-bias in the persistence of default effects.
Three recent empirical papers relate closely to this study. First, Brown and Previtero
(2014) study employees of the University of Illinois and find that procrastinators—individuals
who wait until the last day of health care open enrollment to make an election–are more
likely to stick with their default 401(k) portfolio allocation, in addition to contributing less
and taking longer to sign up for a 401(k) in the first place. Second, studying the same
population, Brown et al. (2015) look at the predictors of staying at a default. Similar to the
heterogeneity we observe, they find that individuals with a tendency toward procrastination,
which they measure using a series of five questions taken from the Melbourne decision-making
questionnaire (an instrument from psychology used to measure decisionmaking tendencies),
are much more likely to be defaulted into a defined benefit contribution (which happens after
six months of employment) rather than make an active plan election. Last, Goda et al. (2015)
examine retirement savings levels in the American Life Panel, finding that it is correlated
5Specifically, we define a social contact as a pair of employees who communicate more than k times
in a month, with k varying from 1 to 10. We do not observe friendships between employees who never
communicate on the phone. However, all between-employee communication is free (i.e., fully subsized by
the employer), and as a result these employees use their phones much as white-collar workers in the U.S. use
email. We thus believe that most significant friendships will be reflected in the mobile phone records.
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with present-bias, measured using questions regarding time-dated monetary payments.
More broadly, this experiment also provides a set of results of potential interest to de-
velopment economists. In Afghanistan, formal financial institutions are widely distrusted
and only 4 percent of the population saves in a bank (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). By con-
trast, 90 percent of Afghans have access to a mobile phone, and a growing share use mobile
money. This is emblematic of a global pattern: only 22% of adults in developing countiries
report saving in formal accounts (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015), and in sub-Saharan Africa,
the number of mobile money accounts has already surpassed bank accounts (GSMA, 2017).
In concert, the International Labor Organization estimates that the share of the developing
world’s households in the middle class or above more than doubled from 1991 to 2011, and is
projected to pass 50% in 2017, with over 60% of these workers in wage employment (Kapsos
and Bourmpoula, 2013).6 As the share of wage earners in developing countries increases,
and as electronic payment systems become more common, products like M-Pasandaz can
provide new options for mobilizing savings.
The key feature of M-Pasandaz is that default salary contributions are passive. Once
enrolled, contributions are automatic and do not require any action from the saver (Chetty
et al., 2014). This may be particularly important in developing countries where many of
the primary obstacles to saving, from simple transactions costs associated with traveling
to the bank (Burgess and Pande, 2005; Callen et al., 2015), to intra-household disagree-
ments regarding savings (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Ashraf, 2009; Schaner, 2015), behav-
ioral issues of dynamic inconsistency (Ashraf et al., 2006; Karlan et al., 2016b; Dupas and
Robinson, 2013), temptation good (including drug and alcohol) consumption (Banerjee and
Mullainathan, 2010; Schilbach, 2017), and ego depletion (Shah et al., 2012), all relate to the
fact that savings must first pass through the saver’s hands, who must then make an active
decision to save (Karlan et al., 2014; Madrian, 2013). Indeed, in developed countries, it
6Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2015) find that 400 million unbanked adults currently receive wages or government
transfers in cash. The payment of salaries via mobile money is now happening in South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin America (cf. Karlan et al., 2016a; Aker et al., 2016; Breza et al., 2017); phone-based and
electronic welfare payments are also becoming increasingly common (Muralidharan et al., 2016).
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is frequently the poorest and least financially sophisticated who respond most strongly to
automatic contributions (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2004; Beshears et al., 2010a).
Taking this approach to its logical conclusion, we show that one of the most effective means
of increasing savings in a developed country context also has immediate relevance to the
fast-growing population of individuals in developing countries receiving digital payments.
These quantitative results match with a more qualitative picture of the lives of the em-
ployees in our study. We conducted focus groups before and after the intervention, and what
emerged was a picture of working people who face many of the same obstacles faced by their
counterparts in stable, developed economies. They pay their rent, electricity and school bills
and then, after the month’s groceries, there’s often nothing left. They want to save, but feel
they cannot afford to – and they are open to creative solutions, such as mobile money and
automatic deductions. In our exit interviews, several employees were effusive in their praise
of how the program gave them a painless new way to save, not least by protecting them from
their own bad habits.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on the Afghan
context. Section 3 describes the M-Pasandaaz product and the experimental design to eval-
uate its effect on savings. Section 4 reports the impact of default enrollment, Section 5
discusses the role of present-biased preferences in creating a default effect, and Section 6
tests for peer effects. Section 7 concludes.
2 Financial Inclusion in Afghanistan
While Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world, it has experienced
a sustained period of growth over the past decade from increased private investment and
international aid. While the Afghan labor force is largely employed in agriculture and small-
scale trading activities, a small but growing salaried class has recently emerged, particularly
in major urban areas like Kabul. In 2015, the World Bank estimated per capita income at
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$594 - about the global average for low-income countries - up from only $120 in 2001, the
first year for which data are available after 1981.
Afghanistan is characterized by low rates of participation in formal financial institutions,
with only 10% of adults reporting ownership of a bank account, and 4% reporting any formal
savings over the past year (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). The supply of banks is limited,
with approximately 2.3 bank branches per 100,000 adults, less than one-third of the South
Asia average (International Monetary Fund, 2015). Afghan banks offer short-term savings
accounts with a floating interest rate and long-term “fixed deposit” accounts with a fixed
interest and term, though the reported rates often fall below the annual inflation rate, which
ranges between 5% and 10%. A demand for savings exists however, with about 25% of
Afghans reporting any savings in the previous year - primarily informally through cash or
in-kind holdings - with common reasons including retirement, school fees, and saving for a
farm or business (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015; Chipchase et al., 2013).
Afghans have experienced nearly four decades of political instability and conflict, and
the focus groups we conducted as part of this study, along with interviews conducted during
scoping research, reveal an unsurprising mistrust of formal financial institutions. Many
respondents report keeping American dollars rather than Afghanis, the local currency, and
when making long-distance transfers forego wire services in favor of hawalas, a trust-based
network of money brokers who operate simply by taking cash and phoning other agents to
disburse money to the intended recipient. While saving money to buy a house or a car seems
out of reach for most, saving money in case of death or illness is an unquestioned necessity.
They often store their money in a metal box at home (a traditional method), or with a
trustworthy (often richer) relative. They tell stories of themselves or people they know going
hungry or reducing food quality after a shock of some kind, and describe the humiliation of
young men unable to marry for lack of money. Along with the differences, however, we also
find many similarities between working Afghans and their Western counterparts. Almost all
focus group members report struggling with bills and running out of cash before the end of
10
the month. In the sessions held before the intervention, workers were nearly unanimous in
saying they did not earn enough to save – but were open to methods that might help.
Formal financial inclusion may be low, but mobile phones are prevalent throughout the
country, with approximately 75 mobile cellular subscriptions for every 100 Afghan adults
(International Telecommunication Union, 2015). More recently, several operators in Af-
ghanistan launched “mobile money” platforms, which deliver rudimentary financial services
to subscribers over the mobile phone network. We focus on one such mobile money platform,
“M-Paisa,” which was launched in 2008 by Roshan Telecom, and which at the time of our
study was the nation’s largest mobile money network with 1.2 million unique subscribers.
In Afghanistan as in other countries, mobile money uses SMS-like functionality to enable
the exchange and storage of value over a basic mobile phone interface, complemented by
a real-world network of agents providing “cash-in” deposit and “cash-out” withdrawal ser-
vices. As mobile phone penetration rates surge in developing countries, mobile money has
emerged as a possible financial instrument for the poor, and there are now more than 500
million active users using over 277 mobile money services in 92 countries (GSMA, 2017).
These accounts have historically been used primarily for interpersonal transfers (Jack and
Suri, 2014; Blumenstock et al., 2016), and in Kenya, the country where mobile money is
most widespread, have led to reductions in poverty (Suri and Jack, 2016). More recently,
however, many mobile operators have begun to offer more sophisticated financial services,
including interest-bearing savings accounts, insurance, and credit products. As of late 2015,
roughly 32 million individuals possessed mobile savings accounts, with an average acount
balance of US$16.18 (GSMA, 2016).7
7See Aker and Blumenstock (2014) for a review of recent literature, and GSMA (2017) for a survey of
empirical data on mobile money in developing countries.
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3 “Mobile-izing” Savings with M-Pasandaz
We worked with Roshan, Afghanistan’s largest mobile network operator, to develop a new
product for the M-Paisa mobile money system, called “M-Pasandaz.”M-Pasandaz facilitates
automatic payroll deductions and employer matching contributions using mobile money.
Prior to our collaboration, Roshan had for a number of years aspired to create a defined
contribution program for their employees.8 Specifically, a Roshan subscriber who owns a
mobile money (M-Paisa) account and is paid via mobile money can enable a parallel mobile
M-Pasandaz wallet and select to have a portion of her salary automatically deducted into
this wallet during each pay cycle. Consistent with Islamic principles, these contributions do
not earn interest, but employers may provide matching incentives.9
Through our study, we provided different versions of the M-Pasandaz account to all
eligible Roshan employees. Our study population consists of 949 full-time Afghan national
employees of Roshan, about 15% of whom are women (Table A2). Employees hold job titles
such as Manager, Engineer, Security Guard and Janitor and are located in six major regional
offices: Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar, Herat, Ghazni and Kunduz. Prior to our study and the
launch of M-Pasandaz, all of these employees were being paid with M-Paisa direct deposits;
that is, each month their monthly wages are deposited into their normal M-Paisa mobile
money account.10 The average tenure in our sample was 5.8 years, and all of Roshan’s
Afghan employees had received mobile salary payments since 2010, so this population was
familiar with the mobile money system.11
8Automatic payroll deductions are widely used to promote savings in developed countries (Beshears et
al., 2009). There are also examples of automatic payroll deductions for savings in developing countries,
such as publicly-mandated pension (or “provident”) funds for private sector workers in India, Malaysia
and elsewhere, which require fixed employee contributions from automatic payroll deductions and employer
matching contributions. While Afghanistan does not currently mandate pension plans for private sector
employers, several of the larger employers, including telecoms and international NGOs, voluntarily offered
such programs. During the period of this study, several private pension and savings schemes were active
in Afghanistan, permitting employee contribution rates between 5-10% of monthly salaries with employer
matches of up to 100% of deposits and vesting periods ranging from monthly to annual.
924 employees (2.5%) described the product as un-Islamic when explaining why they did not to participate.
10While there is a withdrawal fee for “cashing out” of the mobile money system, each mobile salary
payment includes the cost of one withdrawal to ensure the entire salary was transfered.
11At the time of our baseline survey in June 2014, Roshan had roughly 1,100 employees, of whom roughly
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Several aspects of the M-Pasandaz account were held constant across all employees. Most
relevant to our design, deposits into M-Pasandaz could only be made via direct deposit at the
time of the regular monthly salary payment; there was no other way to transfer funds into the
M-Pasandaz account. Each pay cycle, regardless of the amount contributed by the employee
to M-Pasandaz, the employee would receive an SMS confirmation indicating how much had
been paid via direct deposit and how much had been placed in the employee’s M-Pasandaz
account. Employees were free to check the balance on their accounts and to electronically
withdraw money at any time; this was done to enable access to liquidity in times of urgent
need. However, any withdrawal made during the initial six-month commitment period would
forfeit that employee’s eligibility for matching incentive payments and eliminate the accrued
matches from their employer.12 All employees were required to attend a 60-minute training
session, during which a representative from Roshan Human Resources described M-Pasandaz
as a “new benefit offered by Roshan” and explained the details of the account.
Two key features of M-Pasandaz account were randomized between employees.13 First,
employees were randomly assigned a default contribution rate. For half of employees, the
default contribution was set to 5% of their monthly salary; for the other half, the default
contribution was set to 0%. To simplify the later exposition, we will occassionally refer to
the 5% group as the “default in” group, and the 0% group as the “default out” group. Note,
however, that all employees were given an account and enrolled, the difference between groups
was simply their default-assigned contribution rate, which all employees had the option to
change at any time.
90% were Afghan national staff paid using mobile money. We exclude from our sample a group of 18
employees who participated in qualitative focus groups and pilot product development, as well as those
employees who had left Roshan prior to the launch of M-Pasandaz in January 2015, leaving us with an
experimental sample of 949 employees.
12The M-Pasandaz account was similar to a commitment savings account in that withdrawals prior to the
six-month deadline forfeited a potential incentive payment, but had key differences in that default enrollment
was linked to salary payments and participants could recover their own contributions at any time without
penalty. For a review of commitment savings products, see Bryan et al. (2010).
13This random assignment was common knowledge from the mandatory training session. Human Resources
representatives informed all employees that Roshan was piloting this new product internally, and would learn
how different features led to different savings outcomes. We address potential internal validity concerns in
Section 5 below.
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Employees were informed of their default contribution rate at the end of the HR training
session through a personalized card that was distributed by the HR representative. During
training, employees were informed that they could change their contribution rate at any time
by calling or visiting the HR department; the goal was to minimize the friction involved in
switching contribution rates. Employees were free to set their contribution rate to any value
between 0% and 10% of their monthly salary. Importantly, this created scope for the default
in group to either increase or decrease their contribution, while the default out group could
only increase their contribution. Any change in the contribution rate was instantaneous and
applied to all future salary payments, with the caveat that each month’s contribution was
locked in on the 15th of the month to give HR sufficient time to prepare monthly payments,
which typically occurred on the 20th of the month.
Subjects were also randomly assigned to one of three different levels of matching incentive
for M-Pasandaz contributions, creating a 2 x 3 design. The employer characterized these
as three different M-Pasandaz “plans” that are distinguished only by the level of matching
incentives: White (0% match), Blue (25% match) and Red (50% match).14 Thus, for each
monthly deposit to M-Pasandaz made by the employee, the employer would make a corre-
sponding deposit at the level specified by the employee’s plan. Employees were informed
that these matching incentives would be available at the end of the six-month commitment
period, but that all accrued incentives would be lost if a withdrawal was made before then.
As opposed to the contribution rate, which the employee could change easily, the employee
could not change his or her matching incentive. Finally, Roshan paid taxes in advance on
the matching incentives, so employees received the exact amount specified by their plan.
Both treatments were stratified by employee salary terciles, self-reported perceptions of
physical insecurity, and provincial office locations, using data collected in a face-to-face base-
line survey of all employees in May and June 2014. Table A2 reports balance tests on a range
14These incentive levels are similar to those in prior literature from developed country (Duflo et al., 2006)
and developing country settings (Carter et al., 2015), and were consistent with savings incentives provided
by Roshan’s competitors in Afghanistan.
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of observable characteristics across all six resulting combinations of the primary treatments.
In December 2014, employees attended the HR training session and were informed of their
default contribution rate and plan assignments. An “open enrollment” period during which
employees could change their contribution rate lasted until January 15, 2015, and the first
automatic contributions were made on January 21, 2015. The sixth and final automatic
contribution occurred on June 21, 2015, and incentive payments were distributed on July
23, 2015. Over the study period, we conducted four phone-based follow-up survey waves
with a randomly selected panel of half the employees. In August 2015 we conducted a final
face-to-face endline survey with all employees participating in the study.
4 The Default Effect
4.1 The Default Effect on Participation and Contributions
During the six-month study window, 459 of the 949 employees (48.3%) elected to change
their contribution rate from their default assignment; the remaining 490 employees remained
at the default. As shown in Figure 1, most of the employees who switched did so in the first
three weeks of the study. Employees who switched came from all plan types (Figure A1)
and cited a variety of reasons for doing so (Table A3). While many employees did change
their contribution rate, the powerful effect of the default is evident in the large number
of employees who never moved from their default-assigned contribution rate (Figure 2).
For instance, 39% of employees who were assigned a default contribution rate of 0% in
the Red plan – all of whom would have received significant financial incentives to save –
left “cash on the table” by continuing to contribute 0% of their salary to M-Pasandaz.
Similarly, 36% of the employees in the White plan who were assigned a default rate of
5% continued to contribute 5% of their salary to M-Pasandaz, even though they received
no financial incentives to do so.15 We estimate the causal effect of the randomly-assigned
15These percentages reflect behavior after two months, and prior to the launch of several randomized
follow-up interventions designed to nudge employees from their default assignment. Behavior over other
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default contribution rate in Table 1. Employees who are “defaulted in” to saving with a
randomly assigned contribution rate of 5% are 40 percentage points more likely to contribute
to the account than employees with a default contribution rate of 0% (Panel A, column 1).16
On the intensive margin, random assignment of a 5% default contribution rate increases
6-month contribution rates by 1.77 percentage points (Panel B, column 1), equivalent to
a 66% increase over the control group’s average contribution rate of 2.7%.17 Thus, the
net effect of default enrollment was to increase monthly employee contributions by 2,426
Afghanis (US$40, Panel C), roughly 10% of the median monthly wage. As enumerated in
Table A1, these magnitudes are consistent with previous non-experimental estimates of the
default effect in large US companies.
4.2 Comparing the Default Effect to Matching Incentives
The employees in our study also responded strongly to the matching incentives provided by
the employer. As can be inferred from the constant terms in columns 2-4 of Table 1 (Panel
A), among employees initially assigned a contribution rate of 0%, the participation rate was
1% for employees with no matching contributions, 27% for employees with 25% matching
contributions, and 57% for employees with 50% matching contributions.
Our design enables us to directly compare the default effect to the effect of matching
incentives. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental study to do so. Figure 3 relates the
default effect to the effect of matching incentives, using the coefficients estimated in Table 1.
At all levels of matching incentives, participation and contribution rates are higher for the
group of employees with a 5% default than for those with a 0% default, and for both groups
relevant periods is presented in Table 7.
16In Table A4, when participation is defined as making a non-zero contribution and never making a
withdrawal, defaulting enrollment increases participation by 31 percentage points. In Table A5, we find
qualitatively similar effects for particiption and contribution rate using the values of these variables at the
end of the study on July 15th instead of February 28th.
17Whereas the extensive effect on participation is present for all levels of matching incentives (Panel B,
columns 1-3), the intensive effect is only present in the White (0% matching contributions) and Blue (25%
matching contributions) plans (Panel B, columns 2-4), suggesting that the strongest financial incentives may
have been sufficient to overcome the default effect.
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the elasticity of participation with respect to the employer match rate is approximately one.
These results can inform the broader debate regarding the effectiveness of behavioral
nudges relative to traditional incentives (cf. Chetty et al., 2014). In our context, the employer
would need to match employee contributions at 50% to achieve the same participation rate
as from merely having employees contribute by default. More concretely, we can calculate
the implicit value of the nudge to the employer in forgone matching incentives: At the end
of the six month pilot, the 159 employees in the 50% match plan who were defaulted out
received a total payout of 699,323 AFA ($13,986.46 USD at the time). If the employer were
considering only giving all employees a 50% match and defaulting them in at 0%, Roshan
would need to provide $83,479 USD (or $87.97 USD per employee) in incentives to achieve
the same participation rate as from only defaulting employees in at 5% with 0% match.18
4.3 The Effect on Total Savings
We wish to understand whether the substantial increase in M-Pasandaz savings represents
a net increase in total savings, or whether employees are instead substituting out of other
savings instruments, as has been the case in several prominent studies in the U.S. and
Western Europe (Benjamin, 2003; Engelhardt and Kumar, 2007; Chetty et al., 2013). Thus,
we conducted a series of longitudinal follow-up surveys with a random subset of employees,
asking employees about their financial behaviors.19 We measure these variables (both income
and savings) at the household level. In our sample, most participants will be the primary
breadwinner in their household. The monthly surveys captured flows in the five main formal
and informal household savings instruments relevant for our sample: (i) the M-Pasandaz
18To generate an equivalent average contribution, rather than an equivalent degree of participation, requires
a 25% matching incentive. To see this, in Table 1 Panel B, defaults increase the average contribution in the
0% match group by 2.38 pp, which is roughly the average contribution of the group defaulted out with a
25% matching contribution.
19All employees participated in face-to-face baseline (January 2015) and endline (August 2015) surveys.
Half of all employees were also randomly selected to participate in higher-frequency phone surveys, which
occurred in March, May, June, and July of 2015. As we discuss in greater detail in Section 5.3, only half of
all employees were selected for high-frequency surveys out of concern that being surveyed might, by itself,
change savings behavior (in short, it did not).
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wallet; (ii) the M-Paisa wallet; (iii) as cash; (iv) in a bank account; or (v) as loans given to
family and friends. We also aggregate these five types of savings to look at a sixth savings
measure: total savings. These survey data are likely reported with error, but the fact that
we observe M-Pasandaz balances in both the survey and administrative data gives us some
insight into this misreporting. As we discuss in Appendix B.2, there is evidence of confusion
by some employees on whether to report stocks (which can be read easily and precisely by
looking at the M-Paisa interface) or flows; after correcting for this, we observe a correlation
between the survey and administrative measures of r = 0.85.
We examine the effect of the default by comparing the comparing monthly flows of
savings in the six categories (Yit) between individuals assigned a default contribution rate of
5% (Default Ini = 1) and 0% (Default Ini = 1):
Yit = γ1Default Ini · Postt + ηi + ψt + εit, (1)
In this specification, Postt is an indicator equal to one in the post-treatment period (sur-
vey waves 2 - 5), and ηi and ψt are employee and survey wave fixed effects, respectively.
We are thus interested in γ1, the difference-in-difference estimator of the impact of default
assignment, pooled across the three employer match rates.20
As shown in Panel A of Table 2, default enrollment in M-Pasandaz causes a positive but
statistically insignificant increase in total savings (Column 1). Across all savings instruments,
the only significant effect is an increase in M-Pasandaz savings, which is evident in both the
20We also investigate whether the default effect varies depending on the assigned employer match rate by
estimating the specification:
Yit = β1 25% Match ·Default Outi · Postt + β2 50% Match ·Default Outi · Postt
+ β3 0% Match ·Default Ini · Postt + β4 25% Match ·Default Ini · Postt
+ β5 50% Match ·Default Ini · Postt + ηi + ψt + εit,
such that each β coefficient provides the difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of treatment assignment
relative to the omitted category (0% employer match and defaulted out). In this latter specification, our
power for pairwise tests of differences in means is somewhat limited by the fact that we are comparing
6 different treatment conditions across only 470 employees. We find a sizable and significant effect for
employees in the 25% match group. These results are reported in Appendix Table A6.
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administrative (Column 2) and survey (Column 3) data. We also find positive effects of
default enrollment on regular M-Paisa account flows using survey data (Column 4). The
remaining columns report imprecisely measured effects of default assignment on alternative
savings instruments (Columns 5-6), loans and transfers made (Column 7) and expenditures
(Columns 8-9).21
While the estimates are imprecise, in the aggregate, they indicate that both M-Pasandaz
and M-Paisa savings are going up, and that this is mostly reflects a reduction in cash savings
and a larger reduction in consumption expenditure. In this exercise, we measure consumption
using a ‘sources and uses’ approach, which first cal
The average default effect masks considerable heterogeneity. In particular, our sample
has remarkable variance in salary levels, ranging from about $115 USD a month (e.g., guards
and janitors) to $5,600 USD a month (senior managers). Consistent with prior work showing
that the default is most important for poorer individuals (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et
al., 2004; Beshears et al., 2010a), we find large and statistically significant increases in total
savings for employees in the lowest salary quartile (Panel B of Table 2). In this quartile, the
net increase in savings is driven by increases in M-Pasandaz and M-Paisa, and is partially
offset by a reduction in cash savings. We interpret these results with some caution, however.
First, while the ‘sources and uses’ add up sensibly for the aggregate sample, in the poorest
quartile it appears that both savings and consumption are increasing. Logically, this is
only possible if employees or their household members are taking on additional outside
work, which we did not record as our sample is salaried (though janitors and guards in
the sample certainly could be increasing household labor participation).22 We additionally
21We might expect the increase in M-Pasandaz savings to crowd out other forms of borrowing (Beshears et
al., 2010b). We observe no effect on borrowing, but this may be due to the fact that our population tended
to be net lenders – less than 6% of our population (53/947) reported receiving loans or transfers at baseline,
a number that did not change significantly over the course of our study.
22Callen et al. (2015) find that a new savings product increases labor market participation increases for
microentrepreneurs in Sri Lanka. An additional concern with these types of outcomes is that, especially in
richer populations, the underlying distributions are fat-tailed, which may mean that substantial samples are
required for the sampling distribution of the regression estimates to converge to their limiting distribution.
This is potentially less of a concern in the bottom quartile of this sample, where monthly flows are smaller.
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examined whether the M-Pasandaz account assisted subjects in dealing with shocks, but
found no empirical evidence that it did so over the 6 months of this study (results available
on request).
In addition to the default effects discussed above, the financial incentives offered by M-
Pasandaz led to sizable increases in total savings (see Appendix Table A6), which appear to
be coming from reductions in general expenditures (though food expenditure, specifically, is
unaffected). Employees in the 50% match group, for example, save about 4,000 more AFs
per month (about $60 USD), independent of default status, than those defaulted out in the
0% match group. The median monthly salary in our sample is about $330 USD, so the
M-Pasandaz program increased monthly savings by about 18% of monthly wages.
4.4 Active Decision and Long-Run Effects
Employees who were randomly induced to save more through our interventions also developed
different savings habits that persisted after the termination of the experiment. Most notably,
at the conclusion of the 6-month study period, all financial incentives were removed, and
employees were individually asked whether they would like to have a portion of their future
salary automatically deposited into their M-Pasandaz account. We required each employee
to make this decision actively, and the decision was the same for all employees independent
of their treatment status during the main experiment. As shown in Table 3, the desire
to continue contributing was significantly higher for the employees who were exogenously
induced to contribute more through a positive default-assigned contribution rate, particularly
in the 0% matching rate group. Overall, employees defaulted in to participating during the
experiment were 10 percentage points (25%) more likely to actively decide to continue to
contribute a portion of their salary to M-Pasandaz.23
Using Roshan’s administrative data, we can also examine how long default effects persist
23Among defaulted out employees, 33.6% of employees originally assigned a match rate of 0% elected to
continue contributing; 39.2% of those originally assigned a match rate of 25% continued (s.e. of difference
= .058, p = .328), and 47.7% of those originally assigned a match rate of 50% opted to continue (s.e. of
difference = 0.060, p = 0.018).
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after matching incentives were removed.24 Figure 4 shows M-Pasandaz participation rates
and balances, separately by default status, for the six months of our study as well as the
following 18 months. As discussed above, savings increased substantially during the study
period, and differentially for employees defaulted in. Participation dropped steeply once
financial incentives were removed, but many employes continued to contribute, particularly
among those randomly assigned to a 5% default. These results are tabulated and disaggre-
gated by matching incentive in Appendix Table A7. We see large and statistically significant
differences by default status six months after the conclusion of the program (column 1).
Columns 2 - 4 separate samples by the initial matching incentive. The group assigned a
25% matching incentive exhibits the largest separation during the six months following the
study, but over the following year it is employees in the 0% match group who show the most
persistent evidence of increased savings due to the default effect.
4.5 Savings Habits
Why were employees initially defaulted in to savings more likely to later make an active
decision to save, and to continue to contribute long after financial incentives were removed?
Our survey data indicate that part of the explanation is that the experience of saving changed
employee perceptions, even though the trial lasted only six months. In particular, employees
defaulted in to savings during the experiment were less likely to report feeling too financially
constrained to save, more likely to feel that savings is important, and more likely to feel
confidence in meeting their financial obligations. These results, as well as a range of other
employee responses collected in our endline survey, are presented in Table 4, where column 1
indicates the average response among employees assigned a default contribution rate of 0%,
and column 2 indicates the increase in response for employees assigned a default contribution
rate of 5%. Since this table includes several outcomes that were not a part of our pre-analysis
plan, we focus on three summary indices in Panel A (importance of saving, financial security,
24Charness and Gneezy (2009), Schaner (2016), and Hussam et al. (2017) provide other examples of how
short-run incentives can affect behavior even after incentives are removed.
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and general well-being), and report a set of p-values that asymptotically control the Family
Wise Error Rate (the probability that any true null is rejected) at 0.05.25 Panels B-D report
the individual survey responses from which the indices are constructed.
The impact of the default on financial perceptions can be seen in the first two rows of
Table 4, Panel A. Default enrollment increased a composite index of the perceived importance
of saving by 0.142 standard deviations and a summary measure of perceived financial security
by 0.111 standard deviations. Results for each of the survey outcomes that comprise the two
composite indices are reported in Panels B and C. Most notably, defaulting employees in
substantially raised the share of employees who believed that they were not too financially
constrained to save. This might reflect the relaxation of a real constraint, where participation
in M-Pasandaz moved employees beyond some minimum threshold of savings to begin to feel
comfortable saving every month, or might reflect a realization that their prior perception that
they were too constrained to save was inaccurate.26 This seems reasonable in the context
of a six-month pilot that meaningfully affected short-run finances, but which ended before
more sustained impact could be realized. Modest but significant default effects are likewise
observed in employees’ attempts to save each month, and in their sense that the M-Pasandaz
program itself changed their desire to save. In Panels D and E, we examine a broader set of
measures of well-being. In general, we do not find evidence that the M-Pasandaz program
impacted such measures of food security, happiness, or employment outcomes.
Of related interest is how employees perceived these savings and the M-Pasandaz ac-
count more generally. M-Pasandaz is a new product, with some features of a mobile money
wallet, and some features of a defined contribution savings account. Employees thought M-
Pasandaz was most similar to a savings account at a bank (Figure A2), and generally viewed
25This practice follows a growing literature on addressing potential Type I error arising from multiple
hypothesis testing in experiments (Casey et al., 2012; Bidwell et al., 2016). Romano (2010) provide a review.
List et al. (2016) describe a technique that simultaneously controls for several sources of Type I error in field
experiments. We control the Family Wise Error Rate for consumption and the three summary indices and
then for all of the variables that comprise the indices separately.
26In Appendix Table A8, we find the results on the importance of savings are driven primarily by the 0%
matching rate group, consistent with updating prior beliefs about their ability to save without incentives.
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their accumulated savings as long-term savings. Indeed, of the 349 employees who made
contributions to their M-Pasandaz account, only about half (n=186) had made a withdrawal
at the time of the endline survey, with the remainder opting to leave the accrued balance
untouched. When asked about their plans for this money, the most common response (after
“Don’t know”) was that employees planned to retain their M-Pasandaz balance as savings
for the future (Figure A3).
Collectively, these data indicate that the M-Pasandaz program—and default assignment
in particular—significantly increased savings during the 6-month trial. Additionally, it ap-
pears that using the product caused employees to change their beliefs about how much they
could feasibly save, causing them to change their behavior. This change is most manifest in
the results related to product take-up at the conclusion of the study, when incentives were re-
moved, and employees were forced to make an active decision regarding whether they wanted
to continue to participate. The data suggest that using the product caused employees’ sav-
ings habits to change such that it became more consistent with their own stated long-run
preferences. Indeed, prior to the study, participants expressed a strong sense that savings
was important to them, but that they simply did not have enough money to save.27 This is
broadly consistent with evidence in more familiar contexts. For instance, Choi et al. (2004)
find that many employees report wanting to save more, suggesting that defaults might help
them overcome a behavioral issue that is impeding their savings goals.28 And to the extent
that policy makers privilege welfare determined using ex ante preferences (Bernheim et al.,
2015), these results suggest that the inducement to save was, on average, welfare improving.
This is important in our setting, where 27% of subjects reported that at least one family
member went without a meal in the week prior to the baseline survey, and there is a concern
that defaults may cause employees to ‘over save.’
27Only one of the 161 employees defaulted to a 0% contribution with no matching incentive opted in during
the first two pay periods. Under the active decision, which effectively placed all employees in the White plan
with no matching incentives, 45 percent of employees chose to contribute.
28In our context, these considerations are made more important by the evidence we present later, which
suggests the present-biased preferences indeed appear to play a role in driving the default effect.
23
5 Understanding the Default Effect
The effect of the default rate assignment – approximately equivalent to a 50% employer
match – is striking, and consistent with evidence on automatic payroll deductions in wealthier
nations.29 Madrian (2013) and Beshears et al. (2009) review common explanations for this
large default effect. First, and prominent in the U.S. literature, is the possibility of an
endorsement effect: employees may perceive their initial assignment as a recommendation
from the employer, leading the employee to defer to the employer’s wisdom and remain at the
assigned rate (cf. Beshears et al., 2009). Second, employees may face large (real or perceived)
switching costs to change from their default-assigned election; when this cost exceeds the
benefit from switching, employees will remain at their default. Third, employees may be
aware of their contribution and know how to switch, but the decision may not be salient to the
employee, or the employee may be inattentive (Karlan et al., 2016b; Mullainathan and Shafir,
2013; Taubinsky, 2013; Mani et al., 2013). A final possibility is that employees with present-
biased preferences may procrastinate over the decision to change from the default assignment,
repeatedly postponing today what they believe they will do tomorrow (O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 1999; Carroll et al., 2009).
To differentiate between these mechanisms, we randomly assigned three additional ex-
perimental interventions, conducted a series of behavioral games to elicit employees’ time
preferences, and asked a battery of pointed questions in our panel surveys. Below, we discuss
the extent to which the empirical evidence supports or refutes each potential mechanism.
5.1 Endorsement effects
A priori, we do not think our context is one in which employer endorsement effects were
important in determining employee response to the default assignment. The nature of the
individual randomization, whereby each employee knew he or she had an equal chance to
29For instance, Madrian and Shea (2001) find that default enrollment increases retirement participation
rates by more than fifty percentage points, and Choi et al. (2002, 2004) note that the vast majority of
employees at several large U.S. corporations keep the contribution rate to which they are assigned.
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be given a 0% or 5% default contribution rate, largely eliminates the potential that employ-
ees would perceive that they were given a default rate for any reason other than random
chance. Qualitatively, employees who participated in focus groups also expressed surprise
(and pleasure) at observing that plan assignments appeared to them to be truly random,
and not distributed in a manner that favored more senior employees. Of course, endorsement
effects may still be consequential in other settings. What we show is that in our context,
where there is no employer endorsement, a large default effect still exists – roughly similar
in magnitude to the default effects observed in developed countries.
5.2 Transaction costs
We similarly find it unlikely that the default effects were driven by superficial transaction
costs involved in switching, such as confusion about how the savings account works, am-
biguity about how to switch, or mechanical difficulties in executing a switch. Such factors
may matter in other settings, but we do not believe they are important in this context.
Roshan went to great lengths to train all employees on the M-Pasandaz account, and each
employee was sent a monthly text message on payday to indicate how much of their salary
was being direct deposited into their normal M-Paisa account, and how much was being put
into M-Pasandaz. Through our follow-up surveys, we also find strong evidence that most
employees understood their plan type and understood what was required to change their
contribution rate. For instance, 284 of 293 (96%) of employees reached for the financial
consultation were fully aware of their match rate and their contribution rate. Similarly, in
a phone-based survey taken at midline, 87% of employees reported fully understanding how
the M-Pasandaz product worked, more than 90% correctly identified their plan assignment,
and over 70% knew that they could change their contribution rate by calling HR.
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5.3 Inattention
Looking closely at Figure 1, there is some evidence that employees may have initially been
unaware of their default assignment. Specifically, we observe a modest increase in switches
on January 23rd, the day after the first payday. Some of these employees likely received a
paycheck that was different from what they expected, and this led them to switch. Subse-
quently, however, we see no more payday effects (row 4 of Table 7), and by February 28,
virtually all switching had ceased. Thus, starting in March 2015, we conducted two experi-
mental interventions to see if increasing the salience of the default assignment would induce
employees to change their contribution rate.
The first “intervention” was simply a series of monthly phone surveys, in which we asked
employees questions about their financial behaviors as well as their understanding of the
M-Pasandaz account. While the primary function of these interviews was to collect panel
data on employee activities that could not be inferred from the administrative records, we
also suspected that the survey itself might impact employee behavior by increasing their
awareness of M-Pasandaz and the salience of their financial decisions (cf. Zwane et al.,
2011). Panel phone surveys were conducted with a randomly selected half of all employees.
The second intervention was to send text message reminders, designed increase awareness
and salience by reminding employees how to switch their contribution rate. The treatment
consisted of a series of text messages, sent roughly at the halfway point of the study, which
reminded the employee of his or her current M-Pasandaz contribution rate, as well as the
phone number to call in order to change his or her contribution rate. These messages were
sent in English, Dari, and Pashto, and came from an official Roshan phone number. Messages
were sent to a random subset of employees, and were tailored to the current status of the
employee. For instance, an example message read, “M-Pasandaz Reminder: Next payday,
5% of your salary will be deposited in your M-Pasandaz account. If you want to change your
contribution, call 079999-3708” (Appendix Figure A4).
Neither of these interventions designed to increase the salience of M-Pasandaz had much
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impact on employee’s switching behavior. This is visibly apparent in Figure 1 (grey and
blue shaded regions), is tabulated in Table 7, and is estimated in the regression results
shown in Table A9. We thus conclude that, after the initial one-month period during which
roughly one third of employees switched into a non-default contribution rate, the remaining
default effect was not driven by limited attention on the part of the employee. As we
discuss below, we believe this is partially due to the fact that many employees appear to
be unable to determine what their optimal contribution should be. This stands in contrast
to other settings, such as commitment and group savings (Karlan et al., 2016b; Kast et al.,
2016), where subjects understand their preferred course of action but need nudges to behave
consistently with those preferences.
5.4 Present Bias and the Default Effect
An essential insight from O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) is that when an action involves
immediate costs and delayed benefits, then na¨ıve present-biased individuals are likely to
procrastinate. The decision of whether to undertake the costly action of enrolling in M-
Pasandaz today, in order to received the delayed benefits of an employer match, reflects
such a decision. Appendix A develops a simple model to situate this insight in our setting,
focusing on how present bias might cause individuals to remain at their default assignment.
The central idea is that individuals have the utility function
U t(ut, ut+1, ...., uT ) = δut + β
T∑
τ=t+1
δτuτ
with 0 < β and δ ≤ 1. In this framework, individuals can either be exponential discounters
(β = 1), present-biased sophisticates (β < 1) who have correct beliefs about their future
preferences (βˆ = β), or present-biased naifs, who incorrectly assume they will not be present-
biased in the future (βˆ = 1). The essential (and intuitive) insight that follows is that while
a sophisticate correctly knows that her future self is unlikely to participate (given current
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non-participation), a naif incorrectly believes the participation constraint for her future self
will be less onerous, because she underestimates the future cost of switching. An additional,
albeit basic, insight that follows is that individuals who discount the future more heavily,
regardless of whether they are present biased, are less likely to participate at all because
participation involves immediate costs and delayed rewards. In short, both present bias and
discount rates are likely to lead to default effects.
5.4.1 Heterogeneity
As shown in Table 5, we find that our measure of present bias (β) robustly predicts whether
an employee remains at their default (column 1), even when controlling for a broad range
of other factors including employee salary, gender, intelligence, salary withdrawal habits,
banked status, and total baseline savings (column 2).30 The coefficient indicates that moving
from the tenth percentile of β in our sample (β = 0.67) to the 90th percentile (β = 1.36) is
associated with a 11 percentage point decrease in the probability that the employee remains
at his default assignment. This effect persists when we restrict the analysis to employees
who are both at their default and who have never made any withdrawals (columns 3 and
4), and when using a simpler, unincentivized measure of present bias collected at baseline in
Table A10.31 In Table A11, we check for heterogeneity in our main effects on participation
by interacting default enrollment with a range of potentially relevant covariates including
present bias, cognitive reflection task (a proxy for intelligence), risk preferences, salary,
30We trim extreme values of the β present bias parameter at the 5% and 95% level, and extreme outliers of
the δ discount factor parameter, as these appear to reflect respondents who did not understand the exercises.
31The measurement protocol for the present bias parameter used in the regression in Table 5 was a
modified version of the time-dated price list method proposed by Andreoni et al. (2015) and described in
detail in Appendix C.3. This is an incentivized measure based on actual time-dated monetary payments. One
drawback of this approach, especially given recent discussions on the elicitation of present-biased preferences
using potentially fungible monetary payments (Cubitt and Read, 2007; Chabris et al., 2008; Andreoni and
Sprenger, 2012; Augenblick et al., 2015; Carvalho et al., 2014; Andreoni et al., 2016), is the reliance on
monetary payments. Since we had a short window of time to survey each employee, and as surveys were
conducted at the employee’s place of work, we had limited options for measuring present bias. We also felt
that the protocol might be more appropriate in our context, given that a substantial share of our sample is
credit constrained. The results reported in Table A10 and described in Appendix C.3, use an unincentivized
measure of present bias, and are qualitatively unchanged. An additional advantage of using the baseline
measure to test for treatment effect heterogeneity is that it could not have been affected by treatment.
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tenure, gender, education level and banked status and find no evidence of heterogeneity by
factors other than present bias.
The importance of present bias is further emphasized by performing the unsupervised test
developed by Athey and Imbens (2016) to evaluate treatment effect heterogeneity. Appendix
Figure A5 highlights the fact that among all covariates, the “honest tree” algorithm identifies
present bias to be the single best determinant of treatment effect heterogeneity.
5.4.2 Financial Consultation
In addition to the robust heterogeneity we observe with respect to present bias, we ran a fi-
nal experimental intervention designed to simplify the decision about what contribution rate
was optimal for that particular employee’s situation, and effecitvely drive the κ switching
cost in our model down to zero. Specifically, we had a representative from Human Resources
call a random subset employees to offer them customized consultations that would answer
questions about the M-Pasandaz product, estimate the employee’s payouts under different
contribution rates, and allow the employee to change his or her contribution rate immedi-
ately. The consultation script is provided in Appendix C.1. When employees were offered
this consultation, they were either told that the consultation would occur immediately fol-
lowing the scheduling call, or that the consultation would occur roughly one week after the
scheduling call. Whether the offer was for a consultation now or later was randomized, in or-
der to experimentally vary each subject’s ability to procrastinate over developing a financial
plan.
Table 6 reports results from this experiment. The consultations were very popular, with
73% of employees accepting when offered an immediate consultation and 79% accepting when
offered a consultation with a week delay. This difference, reported in column 1, suggests
slightly more demand for consultations offered with a delay, although this difference is not
statistically significant (s.e. = 0.046, p = 0.200). The difference increases slightly when
controlling for other employee characteristics (column 2: s.e. = 0.048, p = 0.132), but
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remains insignificant at conventional levels. Interestingly, estimates reported in column 3
indicate that for employees with β < 1, the difference is 18.6 percentage points, and is
significant at conventional levels. This relationship is generally robust to adding a set of
controls (column 4), but loses significance after adding a full set of covariates and their
interactions with the consult later treatment dummy (column 5: s.e. = 0.094, p = 0.149).32
But while the financial consultation was the most effective approach to induce employees to
switch from their default rate, even this very heavy-handed treatment only moves a small
fraction of employees.33
Collectively, these results suggest that the financial consultation removed some obstacle
to switching away from the default, and did so particularly for employees who remained at
a default-assigned rate of 5%. But what about this consultation – which may have affected
employees in several ways – was critical to helping employees switch? In our data, we observe
employee response to the consultation offer at three key stages: (i) whether the consultation
offer was accepted and scheduled; (ii) whether the employee answered the phone for the
scheduled consultation; and (iii) whether the employee asked any the HR officer to walk him
or her through different contribution scenarios.34 Importantly, the employees were asked at
each distinct stage of the consultation whether they would like to skip ahead. This provides
some scope for exploring which element of the consultation is most strongly associated with
switching from the default.
Estimates in Table 8 suggest that it is the last stage – asking for assistance with financial
32In Table A12 we also find negative effects using the unincentivized basline measure of present bias, but
lack statistical power to reject the null hypothesis.
33Table A13 explicitly compares the effects of the financial consultation and the SMS reminders on the
employee’s decision to switch. While the effect of the text messages is small and statistically indistinguishable
from zero, the offer of the financial consultation has a large and significant effect, particularly for subjects
still at their default election (Column 2). Within this subsample, the effect of offering a financial consultation
was even larger for those subjects who were enrolled by default, i.e., who were assigned a default contribution
rate of 5% (column 3 of Table A13).
34469 of the 928 employees still active in our study were assigned to be offered a consultation. Of these,
443 employees answered the first call making the initial offer. Of these 443, 327 employees agreed to a full
consultation. Of the 327 employees who accepted the consultation, 295 were reached by the second caller
offering the consultation. Of the 295 employees who both accepted and who were reached for a consultation,
95 requested assistance with calculating how much money they would earn in different contribution scenarios.
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consultations during the call – that leads individuals to switch their contribution. These es-
timates are largely unchanged even after controlling for a broad set of control variables, and
are entirely driven by employees increasing their contribution rates after the consultation.
While the decision to solicit assistance is endogenous, this correlation provides some indica-
tion that the consultation was particularly effective in helping employees work through the
financial implications of switching from their default-assigned contribution rate (and partic-
ularly for those assigned a positive default rate and still at their default, as in Table A14).
Relating this observation back to the potential role for (naive) present bias to create default
effects, the consultation – and providing assistance with financial math in particular – can be
thought of as removing an important cost to switching. Even for naive and severely present-
biased individuals, in the model of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), for example, completely
eliminating transaction costs will eliminate procrastination. This is empirically what we ob-
serve. This also carries a policy implication: one way to eliminate persistent procrastination
that is welfare-reducing, at least when evaluating using long run preferences, might be to
eliminate switching costs.35
The evidence presented thus far indicates that present-biased employees are most likely
to remain at their default-assigned contribution rate, that present-biased employees are more
likely to accept a financial consultation when it is offered with a week delay, and that the
financial consultation – which we believe reduced the mental costs faced by employees when
deciding to switch – was the lone experimental intervention that induced a significant share
of employees to switch. These distinct pieces of evidence lead us to believe that a significant
portion of the default efffect in our setting can be explained by present bias exacerbating
the cognitive cost associated with calculating alternative savings scenarios.
35Of course, the finding that financial consultations reduces the default effect is consistent with alternative
explanations. For example, it could just be that an extended consultation is the only action that raises
the salience of the decision enough to induce switching. However, such an explanation would be hard to
reconcile with other survey-based evidence indicating employees were acutely aware of M-Pasandaz activity.
Alternatively, the financial consultation may have influenced employees in other ways as well, for instance
by providing information that would help the employee choose an optimal contribution rate. This may be
a part of the explanation, but outside of the consultation, very few employees took the initiative to consult
an HR representative for such advice.
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6 Peer Effects
To our knowledge, this study is the first to estimate the effect of default assignments in
automatic payroll deduction within the context of a randomized experiment, where employees
within a single firm are randomly assigned different default contribution rates and different
financial incentives to contribute. This design offers some distinct advantages. It makes
it possible to experimentally compare defaults against financial incentives as inducements
to save. It also reduces the likelihood that employees will perceive an endorsement effect
in their default-assigned rate, which is helpful in disentangling the mechanism behind the
persistent default effect.
At the same time, individual randomization raises concerns about the external validity
of the effects we observe. If employees know that their initial contribution rate and their
employer-provided matching incentives were determined by pure chance, they could respond
differently than they would have if they were all assigned a uniform plan. This could lead
us to overestimate the default effect for certain employees. For instance, an employee with
no matching incentives and a default contribution rate of 0% may choose not to increase his
contribution because he is aware that many of his coworkers are receiving a 50% match on
contributions. If this employee would have changed his contribution rate in a world where
everyone received the same 0% match, our estimates of the default effect would be inflated.36
We address these concerns both qualitatively, and through a novel empirical approach that
relies on our ability to observe the complete social network of all Roshan employees.
36There is also the possibility that employees might behave strategically if they believe their actions
might impact future policy decisions made by the firm. We believe such strategic behavior to be unlikely
for several reasons. First, as noted in Section 4, the default effect persisted even after all employees were
standardized onto a single plan, when employees were asked to decide about future contribution to M-
Pasandaz. Second, the vast majority of Roshan employees are liquidity constrained and live paycheck-to-
paycheck, and even in the relatively short 6-month window, an employee’s contribution decisions had major
economic consequences. It thus seems unlikely that such a large portion of employees would intentionally
forgo salary (or matching incentives) to influence policy. This is particularly true given the relatively high
rates of employee churn: roughly 10% of all employees left the company in the year between our baseline and
endline surveys. Particularly given the evidence of present bias discussed earlier, it seems unlikely that a
large fraction of employees would intentionally act against their own interests in order to potentially influence
the long-run decisions of the employer. We raised this concern with the HR department at the outset of the
study, and they considered it a highly implausible proposition.
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Qualitatively, we worked closely with Roshan HR on the messaging of the M-Pasandaz
program and the framing of the 6-month evaluation period. The M-Pasandaz program
was introduced to employees during hour-long training sessions that emphasized the private
nature of the individually-assigned plan and the importance that each employee make a
personal decision about his or her preferred contribution rate. Great care was taken to
explain that the study was being run by academic researchers, and that each employee had
an equal chance of being assigned to each of the different plans. Plan details were handed
out on written information cards, and employees were instructed not to ask their coworkers
about the details of their plans. While we do not believe these efforts eliminated information
sharing or possible feelings of jealousy, every effort was made to encourage each employee to
make a personal financial decision.
In addition, we use a novel source of data on the social ties between employees at Roshan
in order to empirically estimate peer effects in the M-Pasandaz program. We are specifically
interested in understanding whether a given employee’s decision to contribute to M-Pasandaz
is affected by the plans to which her friends and close colleagues are assigned, and whether
such peer effects might impact the primary treatment effects of default assignment and
matching incentives presented in Table 1.
To measure each employee’s connections to other employees, we obtained the original
transaction records of all phone calls placed between Roshan employees in October 2014,
two months prior to the launch of the M-Pasandaz program. Roshan, the employer in
our study, is also Afghanistan’s largest mobile phone operator, and provides each Roshan
employee with a special phone that allows for free calling to any other Roshan employee.
We use these data to model the structure of the social network formed by Roshan employees
(Appendix Figure A6), and consider a social tie to exist between two Roshan employees if
we observe any phone communication between the two employees in that month. Within
this firm, employees use their phones much as white-collar workers in the US use email,
so while we do not observe any friendships that never involve mobile communication, we
33
believe our dataset allow us to observe the majority of real-world social connections. In our
empirical specifications, we consider several different thresholds of minimum communication
that might reasonably be indicative of a social tie.
We find little evidence that employees’ financial decisions are influenced by the random
assignments of their peers. To estimate these peer effects, we use an estimation framework
similar to that of Miguel and Kremer (2004), where we estimate the primary treatment
effect (of default assignment) on an individual i, conditional on the treatment assignment
of i’s peers. The intuition we are testing is that if peer effects exist, we would expect
them to appear amongst employees who have an exogenously larger share of their social
network assigned to a certain plan type. For instance, a “jealousy” effect might be manifest
in lowered contributions among employees who have a larger share of their social network
randomly assigned to the largest matching contribution incentive.
Column 1 of Table 9 shows the average treatment effect of i’s default assignment, repli-
cated from Table 1. The subsequent columns include controls for the random assignment of
i’s peers, where “peer” is defined as individuals with whom i had communicated over the
mobile phone network on k different occassions, with k increasing from 1 to 10 in columns 2
through 11. Across all of these variants, the main treatment effect never significantly devi-
ates from the original estimate from Table 1. The peer effects themselves are also generally
insignificant, with no discernable pattern to the sign or magnitude of the coefficients. Indeed,
when we compute the total predicted peer effect for each employee, using the coefficients
from Column 2 of Table 9 and the actual social network structure of each employee, we
find the predicted peer effects are all quite close to zero (Appendix Figure A7). Additional
robustness tests, presented in Appendix Figure A8, indicate that in addition to the lack of
peer effects on the decision to participate, we see no evidence of peer effects on the intensive
margin of contribution rate or total savings.
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7 Conclusions
Exploiting the carefully planned launch of a new phone-based savings account, we evaluate
the role of defaults and financial incentives on the savings decisions of a heterogenous group
of Afghan employees. Both effects are substantial, and together help employees accumulate
meaningful savings, with the average participating employee saving 12,270 Afghanis, equal
to 37.2% of the average monthly salary, over the initial 6-month evaluation period. In exit
interviews with the subjects in our study, we were struck by the extent to which employees
embraced the new technology. One employee told us that on payday, all of the neighborhood
clothing and cosmetics vendors would be excited to see her because they knew she was out
to spend a good chunk of her paycheck. M-Pasandaz helped her precommit to cutting down
on that spending, and she was happy with that change.
This paper also adds nuance to our understanding of why defaults affect behavior, through
what to our knowledge is the first experimental estimates of the effect of automatic payroll
withdrawals. Here, our results support the notion that default effects exist in part because
present-biased employees procrastinate over the task of making a non-default election. While
the link between present bias and default effects was widely suspected in prior literature,
our context allows us to make substantial progress in characterizing why the default effect
influences behavior. Here too the regression results resonate with stories on the ground: one
employee in the default-in group, when forced to make the active savings decision at the
conclusion of our study, reported that he’d been meaning to force himself to change his rate
for each of the prior six months, but had never managed to find the time to think through
how a change would impact his monthly budget.
To the extent our study makes progress, it is mainly because our implementing partner
committed to a deep collaboration from the outset (and perhaps because more fine-grained
data collection was feasible in our setting). We believe this example is potentially instruc-
tive for models of engagement where these questions are most studied: in firms in developed
countries. Our partner allowed us to work on the design and experimental implementation
35
of the product and to conduct a series of experiments and longitudinal surveys with their
employees. This added value for the firm. It provided them evidence on whether the de-
fault works, the matching incentive they would need to provide to achieve a similar affect,
what matching levels they should consider, and, most importantly, whether and how this
product affected the lives of their employees. In addition, because we worked with phone
company, this provided them evidence to determine whether they should add it to their set
of commercial products (which they have done).
Nonetheless, we are still some distance from fully understanding how to characterize
the inertia that results from defaults, and in developed countries additional complications
arise (for instance, regarding taxes and asset mixes). In our view, comparable projects in
developed countries could shed substantial insight on key policy questions related to savings.
Indeed, in rich countries, the use of defaults to encourage retirement savings provides,
perhaps, the canonical example of applying behavioral insights to policy design. Appropri-
ately, most academic research on the subject uses data from these settings; this is by and
large where these programs exist. However, a growing body of research emphasizes the po-
tential for behavioral departures from rationality to be even more damaging in developing
countries. The world’s poor may face a much greater scarcity of mental resources to think
carefully about the long run; they may be credit and resource constrained in ways that
exacerbate behavioral tendencies; they often face worse decision environments; and they
typically benefit from far fewer institutions for financial protection. Our hope in designing
and evaluating this product is to provide an example of how policies designed to overcome
these obstacles in developed countries might be ported to developing countries.
While our context is that of a single large firm in Afghanistan, there is reason to believe
these results are relevant to a much larger population in developing countries who are entering
the digital payment ecosystem. In sub-Saharan Africa, more individuals have mobile money
accounts than bank accounts, and the number of regular wage earners is rapidly expanding.
Between 2001 and 2011, the share of the developing world’s workforce in the middle class
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or above nearly doubled (Kapsos and Bourmpoula, 2013), and 400 million unbanked adults
currently receive wages or government transfers in cash (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). For
policymakers interested in increasing savings among this emerging middle class, default
enrollment in automatic, phone-based contributions provides a novel and compelling option.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Switching behavior over time
Notes: Black dots indicate the number of employees calling in, on each day of the study, to change their
contribution rate. Dashed vertical lines indicate the days when employees receive their salary (dashed blue
line), and the deadline to make changes for that pay cycle (dashed red line). Shaded regions indicate the
experimental interventions of our study.
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Figure 2: Employee contributions: Inital assignments and final contribution rates
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Notes: Distribution of final M-Pasandaz contribution levels in July 2015, as a percentage of monthly salary.
Individuals were randomized into either a default 0% contribution (peach bars, N=478) or a default 5%
contribution (green bars, N=471). Individuals were further randomized into three different incentive rates:
White (0% match, N=319), Blue (25% match, N=316) and Red (50% match, N=314). Semi-transparent
bars indicate the original assigned contribution rate, solid bars indicate final contribution rate.
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Figure 3: Effect of automatic enrollment and matching contributions on (a) participation
rates (non-zero contributions), measured on February 28, 2015, following the first two pay-
days but prior to the rollout of phone surveys or secondary interventions; and (b) contribution
rates, as a fraction of the employee’s total salary, measured on February 28, 2015.40
Figure 4: M-Pasandaz participation and balance during and after RCT
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(a) Average Participation Rate (administrative data)
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
M
-P
a
z
 B
a
la
n
c
e
 (
A
fs
)
0 5 10 15 20 25
Months Since Launch
Default Out Default In +/- 2 se
(b) Average M-Pasandaz Balance (administrative data)
Notes: The randomized trial ran from January 2015 (month 1) until July 2015 (month 7), when bonus
payments were paid. Average participation and balance are calculated separately for employees assigned a
default contribution of 0% of their salary (Default Out) and those assigned a default contribution of 5%.
Participation is coded as missing in July 2015 as no automatic contributions were made while endline surveys
took place; deposits resumed in August 2015 based on active savings decisions in the endline survey (see
text for details).
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Table 1: The Effect of Automatic Enrollment - Total Contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent Variable = Participates (non-zero contribution rate)
Default In (=1) 0.40*** 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.29***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.28*** 0.01 0.27*** 0.57***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 936 315 312 309
R-Squared 0.161 0.304 0.190 0.105
Panel B. Dependent Variable = Contribution Rate (% of Salary)
Default In (=1) 1.77*** 2.38*** 2.22*** 0.61
(0.26) (0.21) (0.46) (0.48)
Constant 2.70*** 0.03 2.61*** 5.54***
(0.20) (0.03) (0.35) (0.39)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 936 315 312 309
R-Squared 0.046 0.293 0.071 0.005
Panel C. Dependent Variable = Total M-Pasandaz Contributions (Afs)
Default In (=1) 2426.40*** 2244.30*** 2996.73** 2052.39
(750.24) (656.96) (1335.00) (1567.93)
Constant 4724.44*** 416.75*** 5015.57*** 8797.03***
(465.52) (157.60) (802.11) (1040.07)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 949 319 316 314
R-Squared 0.011 0.036 0.016 0.005
Notes: Dependent variable in top panel, Participates (=1), is a binary variable that
equals one if the contribution rate is greater than zero, and dependent variable in middle
panel, Contribution Rate (% of Salary), is the monthy contribution rate into M-Pasandaz
as a percent of total salary. Participates and Contribution Rate reflect values observed
as of February 28, 2015, following the first two paydays but prior to the rollout of phone
surveys or secondary interventions. Dependent variable in third panel is total contributions
made by the employee to M-Pasandaz, in Afghanis, as observed in administrative data.
Value reflects total contributions net of withdrawals as of July 15, 2015, just prior to the
disbursement of matching incentives. Value does not include matching contributions made
by the employer. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors reported in
parentheses.
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Table 2: The Impact of Being Defaulted Into M-Pasandaz on Household Savings
Total M-Paz M-Paz M-Paisa Cash Bank Loans or Consumption Food
Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Transfers Expenditure Expenditure
(Survey) (Admin) (Survey) (Survey) (Survey) (Survey) (Survey) (Survey) (Survey)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A - Default Effects
Default In x Post 1711.09 464.75** 550.19*** 1395.14* -743.54 419.57 377.36 -1537.40 619.65
(2311.38) (191.91) (171.42) (772.04) (847.62) (1288.12) (582.45) (3355.89) (462.19)
Contol Mean 10214.54 658.57 596.35 2658.82 2458.58 2407.01 1066.93 37488.00 3801.98
# Employees 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470
# Observations 1969 1969 1969 1969 1969 1969 1969 1969 1549
R-Squared 0.013 0.084 0.135 0.007 0.023 0.010 0.011 0.005 0.021
Waves 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5
Winsorize (Top) 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Panel B - Heterogeneity by Salary Quartile
Default In * Post * 1st Salary Quartile 4329.82* 254.20** 189.80 3134.45*** -822.24 -51.33 1099.95 4705.62 621.65
(2344.65) (102.67) (125.26) (1098.43) (885.47) (478.40) (745.21) (6485.91) (692.46)
Default In * Post * 2nd Salary Quartile -1743.08 -48.45 49.65 -196.10 -288.65 -914.93 390.71 -1924.55 -672.24
(2709.33) (173.88) (148.44) (1442.35) (1573.56) (925.29) (652.14) (4845.72) (684.66)
Default In * Post * 3rd Salary Quartile -6157.88 687.19*** 626.16*** 1658.07 -1759.29 -4199.33* -32.37 467.25 1061.03
(4563.54) (237.47) (233.61) (1299.94) (1446.66) (2399.69) (989.18) (4968.89) (892.39)
Default In * Post * 4th Salary Quartile 10420.76 831.69 1202.38** 903.30 -95.98 6933.39 239.80 -8743.88 1484.75
(7046.77) (643.89) (548.66) (2120.49) (2405.42) (4407.49) (1825.19) (9561.56) (1304.32)
Control Mean - 1st Salary Quartile 4638.85 171.68 250.38 1494.81 1700.71 518.67 321.58 27083.28 2502.07
Control Mean - 2nd Salary Quartile 6704.00 565.64 475.23 2161.44 1814.23 537.45 952.81 25212.03 3137.96
Control Mean - 3rd Salary Quartile 8532.11 538.60 550.00 2917.55 2201.91 1301.56 941.25 35475.43 3942.26
Control Mean - 4th Salary Quartile 21860.22 1400.98 1144.10 4147.36 4263.95 7721.89 2107.30 64537.17 5785.96
# Employees 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470 470
# Observations 1969 1969 1969 1969 1969 1969 1969 1969 1549
R-Squared 0.022 0.122 0.187 0.010 0.031 0.020 0.019 0.008 0.025
Waves 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5
Winsorize (Top) 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Notes: This table reports the effect of M-Pasandaz on total household savings, expenditure, and savings sub-categories. An observation is a respondent-month. Dependent variables are in
Afghanis (Afs) and indicate monthly asset flows in columns (2)-(7) and different expenditure types in columns (8)-(9). Coulmn (1) is the sum of columns (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7). Column
(2) ) uses administrative data for monthly flows into M-Pasandaz. Column (3) reports survey responses for monthly flows into M-Pasandaz accounts, adjusted to correct for stock reporting
(see text for details). Column (4) reports survey responses for monthly flows into M-Paisa accounts. Column (7) includes loans or transfers given (not received) by the respondent. Sample
includes baseline pre-treatment responses and 4 follow-up surveys, except in columns (8) - (9) where it includes pre-treatment responses and 3 follow-up surveys due to data availability.
These variables are constructed using a ”sources and uses” approach where respondents are asked to account for all household income, and then asked to account for all savings, and reconcile
both numbers. Consumption is calculated as the residual of income minus savings. Food expenditure is captured in a separate survey module where respondents are asked to recall the
previous weeks expenditure by item. Total weekly food expenditure is multiplied by four to produce an estimate of monthly food consumption. All variables are winsorized at the 99th
percentile. Consumption, is additionally winsorized at 0, replacing 102 observations that report a negative value (respondents who report adding to household savings by more than the
household earned). All regressions include employee fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects and a “Post” binary variable that equals one for all waves after the baseline. All variables are
trimmed at 1%. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors, clustered at employee level, reported in parentheses.
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Table 3: The Effect of Automatic Enrollment - Active Decision at Trial End
Continued M-Pasandaz After Program (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Default In (=1) 0.10*** 0.16*** 0.07 0.08
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.40*** 0.34*** 0.39*** 0.48***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 811 272 277 262
R-Squared 0.011 0.025 0.005 0.007
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator that equals one if the employee
made an active decision to continued contributing to the M-Pasandaz after the 6
month study ended with no matching incentives offered. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
44
Table 4: The Default Effect on Savings Behavior, Financial Security, and Well-Being
Outcome: Control Default Naive List et al Bonferonni
Mean Effect p-Value p-Value p-Value
Panel A: Composite Indices
Importance of Saving Index -0.004 0.142 0.002 0.007 0.008
Financial Security Index 0.002 0.111 0.005 0.013 0.020
Well-Being Index -0.001 0.025 0.512 0.505 1
Panel B: Financial Security Index Variables:
Not Too Financially Constrained to Save (=1) 0.639 0.073 0.026 0.100 0.128
Confident Meeting Current Fin. Obligations (=1) 0.929 0.036 0.020 0.091 0.097
Confident Meeting Future Fin. Obligations (=1) 0.798 0.023 0.412 0.663 1
Will Retire Someday (=1) 0.373 0.001 0.971 0.973 1
Financial Satisfaction (1 - 10) 6.443 0.323 0.027 0.083 0.142
Panel C: Importance of Saving Index Variables:
Savings is Important (=1) 0.954 0.004 0.756 0.767 1
Attempts to Save Each Month (=1) 0.627 0.074 0.026 0.051 0.078
M-Paz Changed Desire to Save 0.539 0.092 0.009 0.032 0.034
Panel D: Well-Being Index Variables:
Nights No One Without Food During Prior Week 6.616 0.042 0.518 0.892 1
Happy Overall (=1) 0.932 0.003 0.853 0.851 1
Life Satisfaction (1 - 10) 7.863 0.036 0.810 0.965 1
Good Physical Health (=1) 0.768 0.072 0.010 0.051 0.055
Healthy Last Three Months (=1) 0.968 0.010 0.441 0.902 1
Panel E: Other Variables:
Satisfied at Roshan (=1) 0.771 0.017 0.548 0.799 1
Left Roshan (=1) 0.142 0.004 0.850 0.855 1
Notes: This table reports the effects of defaulting employees into the M-Pasandaz automatic salary withdrawal savings account.
Indices are created as the covariance-weighted sum of z-scores of the underlying variables, following the technique described in
Anderson (2008). List et al. (2016) and Bonferonni P-values are calculated controlling for the Family Wise Error Rate for the
first five variables reported in the table, and then for each set of variables underlying the index respectively. Full text of the
survey questions used to create indices is available in Appendix C.2.
45
Table 5: Present Bias and Contribution Changes
Dependent Variable: Still at Default on February 28 Still at Default and
No Withdrawal on Feb. 28
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Present Bias Parameter (β) -0.132** -0.132** -0.088* -0.089*
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Long Run Discount Factor (δ) 0.028 0.029
(0.053) (0.054)
Cognitive Reflection Test (0-3) -0.060** -0.069***
(0.025) (0.025)
Risk Preference (1-10) 0.008 0.009
(0.006) (0.006)
Salary (1000 Afs) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Tenure at Roshan (Years) -0.009 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Male (=1) 0.055 0.055
(0.055) (0.055)
Education Level -0.002 -0.005
(0.018) (0.018)
Uses a Bank Account (=1) -0.041 -0.037
(0.041) (0.041)
Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday (=1) 0.024 0.026
(0.040) (0.040)
Capable of Fixing Phone (=1) 0.077** 0.056
(0.039) (0.039)
Constant 0.726*** 0.679*** 0.634*** 0.589***
(0.054) (0.126) (0.055) (0.128)
Control Mean 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73
R-Squared 0.009 0.032 0.004 0.026
# Employees 702 678 702 678
Notes: This table reports on the variables that predict whether a participant remains at their default election on February
28, 2015, two months after the start of the experiment. β is a measure of present bias obtained in an experimental elicitation
completed at endline with real stakes (see paper text for details). The remaining variables are described in Appendix C.2.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table 6: Consultation Offer Results By Present Bias
Accepted Consultation (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Consult Later 0.056 0.080* -0.020 0.006 0.421*
(0.046) (0.048) (0.062) (0.065) (0.233)
Present Biased (=1) -0.057 -0.041 -0.007
(0.069) (0.070) (0.072)
Consult Later x Present Biased 0.186** 0.180* 0.136
(0.093) (0.093) (0.094)
Consult Later x Cognitive Reflection Test -0.053
(0.067)
Consult Later x Risk Preference -0.012
(0.016)
Consult Later x Salary -0.004**
(0.002)
Consult Later x Tenure at Roshan 0.004
(0.017)
Consult Later x Male -0.095
(0.152)
Consult Later x Education Level -0.014
(0.038)
Consult Later x Uses a Bank Account 0.072
(0.102)
Consult Later x Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday -0.170*
(0.097)
Consult Later x Capable of Fixing Phone -0.071
(0.102)
Constant 0.734*** 0.774*** 0.757*** 0.808*** 0.613***
(0.033) (0.115) (0.042) (0.121) (0.175)
Control Mean 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
Covariates No Yes No Yes Yes
# Observations 339 330 339 330 330
R-Squared 0.004 0.038 0.017 0.051 0.089
Notes: Accepted Consultation Offer (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if the employee agreed to participation in a financial
consultation regarding their participation in the M-Pasandaz program (see paper text for details). Consult Later (=1) is a binary
variable that equals zero if the employee was randomly assigned to receive a consultation on the same day as the consultation offer
was made, and equals one if the consultation was assigned to take place one week later. Present Biased (=1) is a binary variable
that equals one if an employee is identified as having β < 1 in an experimental present bias elicitation completed at endline with
real stakes (see paper text for details). Columns (2), (4) and (5) include covariates for cognitive reflection task, risk preference,
salary, tenure at Roshan, gender, education level, uses a bank account, withdraws entire salary on payday, and capable of fixing a
phone – see Appendix C.2 for questions. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table 7: Contribution rate switches, by default contribution and matching incentives
Default Out Default In
N Total % 0% 25% 50% 0% 25% 50%
Changed In Open Enrollment 326 943 34.57 0 32 68 75 80 71
Changed After 1st Payday 22 943 2.33 0 7 4 3 6 2
Changed By February 28th 385 936 41.13 1 42 89 84 89 80
Changed After Other Payday 2 936 0.21 0 1 0 0 0 1
Changed After Survey 3 441 0.68 0 0 0 1 2 0
Changed After SMS 6 224 2.68 0 0 2 2 2 0
Changed After Consultation 54 469 11.51 10 7 6 8 11 12
Changed More Than Once 14 949 1.48 2 2 5 2 3 0
Ever Changed Contribution 459 949 48.37 11 49 96 100 107 96
Never Changed Contribution 456 890 51.24 142 101 57 51 50 55
Observations 161 158 159 158 158 155
Notes: “N” indicates the number of unique employees who changed their contribution rate as a result of the
action. “Total” indicates the number of participants that were treated by the specified treatment and is adjusted
to account for attrition at the time of calculation. For example, “Ever Changed Contribution” row includes all
949 employees, while “Never Changed Contribution” includes only 890 employees still present in final month
of study. Payday, Survey, SMS and Consultation switches are recorded if corresponding to the day of the
intervention or the day immediately afterwards.
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Table 8: Which Element of the Consultation is Associated with Switching
Dependent Variable: Changed Contribution
After February 28 (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assigned Consultation (=1) 0.091***
(0.018)
Accepted Consultation (=1) 0.154***
(0.024)
Did Not Delay Consultation (=1) -0.083 -0.090
(0.270) (0.273)
Asked for Overview of M-Paz (=1) 0.042 0.070
(0.047) (0.051)
Initial Questions about M-Paz (=1) 0.047 0.050
(0.049) (0.052)
Aware of M-Paz Plan and Rate (=1) -0.139* -0.171*
(0.079) (0.088)
Asked to Repeat Projected Balance (=1) 0.124* 0.114*
(0.066) (0.069)
Calculation Assistance (=1) 0.377*** 0.387***
(0.058) (0.058)
Additional Questions about M-Paz (=1) 0.043 0.034
(0.058) (0.064)
Control Mean 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.16
Covariates NO NO NO YES
R-squared 0.027 0.040 0.312 0.332
# Employees 927 443 295 287
Notes: This table reports which elements of the financial consultation predict whether an employee
switches their contribution. 469 of the 928 employees still active in our study at the time of this
intervention were assigned to be offered a consultation, establishing the sample for column (1). Of
these, 443 employees answered the call making the initial offer, establishing the sample for column (2).
Of these 443, 327 employees agreed to a full consultation. Accepted Consultation is a dummy variable
equal to 1 for these employees. Of the 327 employees who accepted the consultation, 295 were reached
by the second caller offering the consultation, forming the sample for column (3). Of the 295 employees
who both accepted and who were reached for a consultation, all completed the consultation. 291 were
able to talk immediately (Did Not Delay Consultation=1), while 4 could not and were reached later. 259
requested an overview of the M-Pasandaz product (Asked for Overview of M-Paz=1), while 36 did not.
91 employees had initial questions about the M-Pasandaz product (Initial Questions about M-Paz=1),
while 204 did not. 285 confirmed that they were aware of their plan and contribution rate (Aware of
M-Paz Plan and Rate=1), while 10 were not. All were informed of their projected balance after six
months including any potential bonus payments, and 52 employees asked for this information to be
repeated (Asked to Repeat Projected Balance=1), while 242 did not. All were offered assistance with
calculating how much money they would earn in different contribution scenarios, 95 requested assistance
(Calculation Assistance=1), while 200 did not. Requesting assistance was not required to change the
level of contribution to M-Pasandaz during the consultation call. 53 employees had additional questions
about the M-Pasandaz product (Additional Questions about M-Paz=1), while 242 did not. Sample size
in column 1 includes full sample subject to attrition when consultation was offered, column 2 sample
includes all employees assigned a consultation, column 3 sample includes all employees who accepted
a consultation, and column 4 excludes employees missing covariates. The additional covariates are:
cognitive reflection test, risk preference, salary, tenure at Roshan, gender, education level, uses a bank
account, withdraws entire salary on payday, and capable of fixing a phone. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 9: Peer Effects - Participates (=1)
Participates (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Default In (=1) 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Degree Red -0.01* -0.02* -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Degree White -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03* 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04** 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Degree Default In 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Degree Total 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03* -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.30***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Control Mean 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Degree Cutoff N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P-Value of Equality 0.80 0.80 0.88 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.93
Mean Degree Total 23.72 14.61 10.31 8.01 6.40 5.30 4.53 3.90 3.38 2.92
# Observations 936 936 936 936 936 936 936 936 936 936 936
R-Squared 0.161 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.164 0.166 0.165 0.164 0.163 0.166 0.165
Notes : Dependent variable, Participates (=1), is a binary variable that equals one if the monthly M-Pasandaz contribution rate is greater than zero,
and reflects values observed as of February 28, 2015, following the first two paydays but prior to the rollout of phone surveys of secondary interventions.
Remaining columns control for the number of social network contacts the employee has which were randomly assigned to each plan type. For instance,
“Degree Red” indicates the number of social contacts the employee has who were randomly assigned to the Red plan (50% matching incentives). A social
contact is defined as an coworker of the employee with whom the employee was observed to communicate k or more times over the mobile phone network
in October 2015 (two months prior to the study period), where k is the “Degree Cutoff” and varies from 1 to 10. Column 1 replicates results from Table
1. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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A Present Bias and the Default Effect
Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), it is evident that when an action involves imme-
diate costs and delayed benefits, then na¨ıve present-biased individuals are likely to procras-
tinate. The decision of whether to undertake the costly action of enrolling in M-Pasandaz
today, in order to received the delayed benefits of an employer match, reflect such a decision.
This section presents a simple framework to situate this insight in our setting.
Consider an employee who is defaulted out of M-Pasandaz and in the 50% match group
who faces an immediate cost of switching κ. The employee is deciding whether to enter the
program. To simplify, imagine the employee is considering whether to make a $2 monthly
contribution and if the employee enters, then they will make no further switches. The
program runs for six months t ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6}, benefits are paid out in t = 7 at the conclusion
of the trial, and, without loss of generality, that the employee has a one period discount factor
δ = 1. If the employee starts making contributions in period t, they will invest $2(7− t) of
principal over the course of the trial and receive back $(7− t) in employer matches.
Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), assume the employee has utility function:
U t(τ) =


βυτ − cτ if τ = t
βυτ − βcτ if τ > t
where τ is the period when the switch is made, υτ is the reward (which is always delayed,
even in the sixth month of the program), and cτ is the cost. Individuals can either be
exponential discounters (β = 1), present-biased sophisticates (β < 1) who have correct
beliefs, denoted as βˆ about their future preferences (βˆ = β), or present-biased naifs, who
incorrectly assume they will not be present-biased in the future (βˆ = 1). We assume that
the payoff for never participating in M-Pasandaz is 0.
The benefits to participation are therefore υτ = 3(7 − τ), as two dollars in principal
plus one dollar in employer match is provided per period of participation, and the costs are
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cτ = κ + 2 + β2(6 − τ), reflecting the switching cost and the stream of payments into the
account over the life of the trial.
An exponential discounter switches if (9 − τ) > κ + 2. Because this is declining in τ ,
a basic prediction is that if an exponential discounter is going to switch at all, they do so
immediately. This embodies the simple intuition that if participation is worthwhile in one
period, then, with no discounting, it is worthwhile in every period, so the employee should
take advantage of the full potential employer match.
A present-biased sophisticate displays a similar pattern of equilibrium behavior. In any
period, a present-biased sophisticate should switch if β(9− τ) > κ+ 2. For a fixed κ, there
exist degrees of present bias such that an exponential discounter will enroll and a present-
biased sophisticate will never enroll. Nonetheless, if it is ever worthwhile for a sophisticate
to enroll, they should do so in the first period.
A present-biased naif, by contrast, could potentially never enroll, while always incorrectly
believing that they will do so in the next period. Consider the simple example of β = 1/2
and κ = 3. Then, in period 1, the employee will not enroll 8β < κ + 2 ⇔ 4 < 5, as the
present discounted benefits are less than the current cost of switching. However, in period
1, they incorrectly believe that they will invest in period 2 if 7 > κ + 2, which, in this case
holds. Yet, when period 2 arrives, they will not invest, as 7β < κ+ 2.
The essential insight here is that while a sophisticate correctly knows that his future self
will only participate if β(9 − τ) > κ + 2, a naif incorrectly believes their future self will
participate if 9 − τ > κ + 2. That is, they think the constraint for their future selfs to
participate is less onerous than it will in fact be when the future becomes the present.
An additional, albeit basic, insight that follows is that individuals who discount the future
more heavily, regardless of whether they are present biased, are less likely to participate at
all because participation involves immediate costs and delayed rewards. For this reason, we
also include estimates of the one period discount factor in addition to a separate measure
for present bias when trying to predict which of our subjects remain at the default.
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B Additional Tests of Robustness
B.1 Robustness of Main Effects
Employees assigned a default contribution rate of 5% could also exit their account by making
monthly withdrawals, rather than calling Human Resources and switching their contribution.
In Table A4, we test robustness of the observed default effect when participation is redefined
to mean both contributing some portion of salary to the program and never having made a
withdrawal. Using this definition, defaulting employees in increases employee participation
by 34 percentage points in the white and blue plans, and by 26 percentage points in the red
plan, with all three differences being highly statistically significant. In Table A5, we show
the main effects for particiption and contribution rate using the values of these variables at
the end of the study on July 15th instead of February 28th, following the series of follow-up
interventions. At this time, defaulting employees in increases participation by 33 percentage
points, and contribution rates by 1.56 percentage points, with similar patterns by matching
rates to Table 1.
B.2 Measurement Error in Survey Data
To assess the quality of our panel survey data, we first examine whether survey data on M-
Pasandaz balances, which is potentially subject to measurement error due to inaccurate recall
or misreporting, corresponds to our administrative data which is measured without error.
For the specific case of the M-Pasandaz balance, however, we can directly compare our survey
measure of reported flows into the account with the administrative record. This comparison
reveals two systematic problems with the survey measure. First, a subsample of employees
appears to respond to the survey question, designed to measure monthly flows, by reporting
their current stock. If we adjust the data by replacing the monthly survey flow as the
difference between monthly survey responses, the correlation between the administrative and
the survey measure rises from 0.51 to 0.71. Second, all respondents appear to report negative
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flows as zero. The correlation between the adjusted survey measure and the administrative
measure rises to 0.85 if we exclude individuals who report a monthly flow of zero from the
data. Table 2 reports results using both the administrative data and the monthly survey
data adjusting the survey response to a monthly flow using the difference between monthly
survey responses for those who appear to be reporting their current stock.
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Figure A1: Switching behavior over time
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Notes: Dots indicate the number of individuals calling in, on a given day, to change their contribution rate.
Top figure shows number of switches by default enrollment status; middle figure shows switches by plan
assignment; bottom figure shows these switches in the context of the treatments that were administered to
random subsets of the population over the course of the study.
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Figure A2: Employee perceptions of M-Pasandaz
Notes: Responses collected in the endline survey, after the termination of the study period. Bars indicate
the percent of employees who chose each option. Employees could only choose one option.
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Figure A3: Employee uses and plans for M-Pasandaz savings
Notes: Responses collected in the endline survey, after the termination of the study period. Employees
could give multiple responses to each question. Bars indicate the fraction of all employee responses that
were affirmative for each expenditure category.
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Figure A4: M-Pasandaz reminder message
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Figure A5: Unsupervised assessment of heterogeneity
Notes: Heterogeneity of main treatment effects, using “Honest Tree” method of Athey and Imbens (2016).
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Figure A6: Roshan employee social network
Notes: Each dot represents an employee. Red dots indicate employees who were assigned a contribution rate
of 5%; green dots indicate employees assigned a default contribution rate of 0%. Dots are sized proportional
to the degree centrality of the employee (i.e., the number of unique contacts in the employee’s network).
Edges indicate the presence of one or more phone calls between a pair of employees; edge color is shaded by
the number of calls, ranging from one call (blue) to many calls (red). The layout of the graph is determined
by an algorithm that places connected nodes close to each other on the 2-dimensional plane (Jacomy et al.,
2014).
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Figure A7: Predicted effect of network on participation
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Notes: For each employee, we calculate the predicted peer effects on that employee’s participation decision.
Specifically, we calculate the number of that employee’s social contacts who were randomly assigned to each
of the different plan variants, and use the coefficients in Table 9 to estimate the total predicted peer effect.
Histogram shows the distribution of these predicted peer effects.
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Figure A8: Coefficients and confidence intervals estimated from peer effects regressions on (a)
participation rates (non-zero contributions), measured on February 28, 2015; (b) contribution
rates, as a fraction of a employee’s total salary, measured on February 28, 2015; and (c) Total
M-Pasandaz Contributions, measured at the end of the six-month study period.
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Table A1: Default Savings Effects in Related Literature
Reference Study population Default Effect Estimate
Bernheim et al.
(2015)
Employees across three large
U.S. firms in chemicals,
insurance and food
Estimating a model of costly opt-out in retirement savings
decisions, 60% of workers have positive opt-out costs, and
40% act as if opt-out costs are negligible (Table 3).
Beshears et al.
(2009)
Subset of employees of a
U.S. office equipment firm
When the default contribution rate is increased from 3%
to 6%, participation at the default increases from 28% to
49%. Participation at or above 6% increases from 65% to
79% (Figure 5.3).
Beshears et al.
(2010b)
645 employees at a U.S.
information sector firm
89% of employees participated when given a 25% match;
80.7% participated with no match. The average
contribution rate also fell from 3.60 percent to 2.89
percent (Table 11.2).
Bronchetti et
al. (2011)
259 eligible tax filers at 8
IRS sponsored Volunteer
Income Tax Assistance
(VITA) sites in the U.S.
The treatment raised savings bond participation by no
more than 8 percentage points (Table 3).
Brune et al.
(2016)
593 households in 10 villages
in Malawi
Net deposits are 13.6% higher for treatment households
who are given a direct transfer compared to the control
group who receives their transfer in cash (Page 4).
Carroll et al.
(2009)
4,580 of 46,944 employees at
a U.S. financial services firm
Enrollment rates are 29 percentage points higher when
employees are forced to make an active enrollment
decision (69%) than under a standard enrollment process
with default non-enrollment (41%) (Figure 1).
Chetty et al.
(2014)
4 million individuals with
savings accounts from the
population of Denmark
85% of individual savers in Denmark can be described as
passive savers who do not respond to subsidies for
retirement accounts, but are instead influenced by the
automatic contributions made for them (Page 1143).
Dobrescu et al.
(2016)
16,988 members of an
Australian pension plan
Among highly educated permanent employees, there is a
4.4% decreased probability that a default member will opt
out of the voluntary contributions default (Table 3).
Luco (2013)
8,888 individuals enrolled in
the Chilean Pension System
55% of people in the Chilean fixed pension system did not
switch from the default saving option, despite significant
changes in the economic environment over the period of
fourteen years (Figure 4).
Goda and
Manchester
(2013)
925 existing union employees
at at U.S. non-profit firm
When an age threshold determines enrollment in defined
benefit (DB) vs. defined contribution (DC), employees
defaulted into DC are 60 percentage points more likely to
enroll in DC plan than those defaulted into DB (Figure 1).
Madrian and
Shea (2001)
13,355 employees from a U.S
health care insurance firm
61 percent of employees hired under automatic enrollment
do nothing to move away from the employer-set default
rate for their 401(k) plan (Table 8).
Somville and
Vandewalle
(2016)
442 villagers in 18 villages in
rural India
Being paid in bank account instead of cash increases the
account balance by 420 Rupees (110 percent) after three
months of weekly payments. Villagers paid in cash do not
save more in other assets and rather increase expenditures
on regular consumption by 402 Rupees (Table 4).
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Table A2: Summary Statistics
Default Out Default In
0% 25% 50% 0% 25% 50% P-Value
All Match Match Match Match Match Match of F-Test
Gender (Male = 1) 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.88 0.59
(0.36) (0.36) (0.33) (0.36) (0.37) (0.39) (0.33)
Married (=1) 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.98
(0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Age (Years) 30.39 30.30 30.13 30.58 30.51 29.98 30.87 0.94
(7.88) (7.51) (7.33) (8.34) (8.14) (7.63) (8.38)
Cognitive Reflection Task 0.60 0.60 0.52 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.70
(0.82) (0.81) (0.77) (0.80) (0.85) (0.86) (0.80)
Risk Preference (1-10) 4.93 5.06 4.74 5.11 5.22 4.59 4.88 0.43
(3.05) (3.17) (3.18) (2.96) (3.04) (3.02) (2.92)
Monthly Salary (1000 Afs) 32.43 30.41 31.20 33.86 34.39 31.72 33.04 0.84
(30.79) (25.01) (24.12) (38.68) (34.84) (26.25) (33.27)
Monthly Savings (1000 Afs) 15.73 12.20 28.26 11.78 16.49 10.77 14.97 0.28
(57.96) (27.70) (119.05) (25.90) (35.77) (21.11) (52.61)
Tenure At Roshan (Years) 5.83 5.73 6.02 5.76 6.02 5.47 6.01 0.53
(3.14) (3.12) (3.15) (3.35) (3.08) (3.08) (3.04)
Education Level (1-6) 4.79 4.80 4.74 4.73 4.87 4.86 4.76 0.84
(1.23) (1.19) (1.30) (1.24) (1.10) (1.23) (1.30)
Has Bank Account (=1) 0.41 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.88
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
Delayed a Bill Payment (=1) 0.41 0.43 0.36 0.47 0.41 0.37 0.42 0.40
(0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50)
Withdraws Entire Salary (=1) 0.41 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.82
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
Capable of Fixing Phone (=1) 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.42 0.48 0.71
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Interested in M-Pasandaz (=1) 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.89 0.84 0.63
(0.35) (0.36) (0.33) (0.37) (0.38) (0.31) (0.37)
Present Biased Baseline (=1) 0.32 0.25 0.36 0.31 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.30
(0.47) (0.43) (0.48) (0.46) (0.48) (0.46) (0.47)
Present Biased Endline (=1) 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.34 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.61
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
Observations 949 161 158 159 158 158 155
Notes: Standard deviations reported in parentheses. See Appendix C.2 for covariate questions. Present Biased Baseline (=1) is a binary
variable that equals one if an employee is identified as having β < 1 in an unincentivized present bias elicitation completed at baseline, and
Present Biased Endline (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if an employee is identified as having β < 1 in an experimental present
bias elicitation completed at endline with real stakes (see paper text for details).
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Table A3: Self-reported Reasons for Switching Contribution Rates
Default Out Default In
N Total % 0% 25% 50% 0% 25% 50%
Panel A: Reasons for increasing contribution rate
Increased - Savings Important 189 285 66.32 7 32 59 9 36 46
Increased - Wanted Incentives 107 285 37.54 0 15 46 0 18 28
Increased - Support Roshan 10 285 3.51 1 1 1 1 3 3
Increased - Demand Commitment 8 285 2.81 0 3 3 0 2 0
Increased - Thought Automatic 5 285 1.75 0 3 2 0 0 0
Panel B: Reasons for decreasing contribution rate
Decreased - Salary Too Low 52 170 30.59 0 0 0 22 17 13
Decreased - Incentives Too Low 49 170 28.82 0 0 0 48 0 1
Decreased - Expenses Too High 35 170 20.59 0 0 0 10 19 6
Decreased - Un-Islamic Product 24 170 14.12 0 0 0 5 10 9
Decreased - Better Options 4 170 2.35 0 0 0 3 1 0
Notes: Total in column 2 reports number of participants that either decreased their contribution rate (rows 1-5) or
increased their contribution rate (rows 6-10). Reasons were not mutually exclusive and respondents were asked to
report all relevant reasons for changing their contribution. “Decreased - Salary Too Low” indicates that respondents
felt their salary was not sufficiently large to allow for savings. “Decreased - Incentives Too Low” indicates that
respondents felt the incentives were not sufficiently high for savings. “Decreased - Expenses Too High” indicates
that respondents felt their other expenses were too high for savings. “Decreased - Un-Islamic Product” indicates
that respondents felt the M-Pasandaz product did not conform with Islamic practices. “Decreased - Better Op-
tions” indicates that respondents reported having better alternative savings options available. “Increased - Savings
Important” indicates that respondents said savings was an important goal for them. “Increased - Wanted Incen-
tives” indicates that respondents mentioned the incentives as important to their decision. “Increased - Support
Roshan” indicates that respondents mentioned wanting to support Roshan’s development of a new product. “In-
creased - Demand Commitment” indicates that respondents mentioned needing commitment devices to help save.
“Increased - Thought Automatic” indicates that respondents mentioned thinking they were automatically enrolled
in the program when they were not.
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Table A4: The Effect of Defaults - Robustness to Withdrawing to Exit the Account
Dependent Variable: Participates and No Withdrawal (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Default In (=1) 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 0.31***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Constant 0.01 0.26*** 0.55*** 0.27***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Sample 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match Full Sample
# Observations 316 313 309 938
R-Squared 0.194 0.111 0.073 0.096
Notes: Participates and No Withdrawal (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if the
contribution rate is greater than zero and the employee never withdrew from their account.
The dependent variable reflect employees’ status as of February 28, 2015, following the first
two paydays but prior to the rollout of phone surveys or secondary interventions. *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table A5: The Effect of Automatic Enrollment - July 15 Values
Panel A: The effect on participation
Dependent Variable: Participates (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Default In (=1) 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.23***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.32*** 0.07*** 0.32*** 0.60***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 890 298 299 293
R-Squared 0.108 0.174 0.148 0.064
Panel B: The effect on contribution rate
Dependent Variable: Contribution Rate (% of Salary)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Default In (=1) 1.56*** 1.89*** 2.20*** 0.42
(0.29) (0.29) (0.50) (0.50)
Constant 3.11*** 0.46*** 3.07*** 5.92***
(0.22) (0.16) (0.38) (0.40)
Sample Complete 0% Match 25% Match 50% Match
# Observations 890 298 299 293
R-Squared 0.032 0.125 0.062 0.002
Notes: Participates (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if the contribution rate is
greater than zero, Contribution (% of Salary) is the monthy contribution rate into M-
Pasandaz as a percent of total salary, and an observation is an employee. Variables reflect
contribution rate values observed as of July 15, 2015, just prior to the disbursement of
matching incentives. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors reported
in parentheses.
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Table A6: Default Impacts on Savings, by Matching Rate
Total M-Paz M-Paz M-Paisa M-Paisa Cash Bank Loans or General Food
Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Transfers Exp Exp
(Survey) (Admin) (Survey) (Admin) (Survey) (Survey) (Survey) (Survey) (Survey) (Survey)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
β1: Default Out x 25% Match x Post -1121.78 645.62*** 412.12*** -3111.20 -1534.95 441.22 -454.08 -278.92 -1719.55 711.80
(2966.74) (200.75) (132.34) (4200.67) (1337.80) (1257.00) (2280.89) (1219.56) (3282.98) (773.53)
β2: Default Out x 50% Match x Post 4221.00 1703.13*** 1590.37*** -2390.95 298.82 907.55 -323.04 538.51 -2995.64 457.94
(2968.33) (286.07) (223.68) (2913.31) (1460.17) (1201.55) (2139.07) (1028.32) (4580.51) (833.74)
β3: Default In x 0% Match x Post 2041.33 323.80* 513.04*** -3056.22 224.44 -1267.55 144.73 792.69 -5623.64 625.80
(3809.67) (193.46) (179.87) (4339.40) (1074.73) (1435.44) (2770.91) (1167.02) (6273.38) (826.03)
β4: Default In x 25% Match x Post 3585.35 1358.97*** 1337.34*** 74.61 1925.06 355.62 -915.67 123.63 -981.01 686.30
(3047.85) (235.83) (226.49) (2935.55) (1207.62) (1263.08) (2250.46) (1168.60) (4088.32) (828.99)
β5: Default In x 50% Match x Post 3804.46 1931.97*** 1645.53*** 1537.37 243.51 -617.27 510.61 833.56 -7656.92* 951.27
(3146.93) (294.99) (244.46) (3479.64) (1233.53) (1404.96) (2224.97) (935.99) (4202.88) (770.28)
Control Mean 8508.89 659.33 577.36 -1447.47 2390.02 2163.13 1680.69 843.23 16567.11 3629.36
# Employees 470 470 470 468 470 470 470 470 469 470
# Observations 1951 1957 1957 1937 1958 1956 1952 1955 1578 1536
Default Effect At 0% Match: β3 = 0 0.592 0.095 0.005 0.482 0.835 0.378 0.958 0.497 0.370 0.449
Default Effect At 25% Match: β1 = β4 0.079 0.020 0.000 0.461 0.010 0.945 0.743 0.748 0.834 0.972
Default Effect At 50% Match: β2 = β5 0.881 0.574 0.867 0.273 0.970 0.250 0.456 0.715 0.338 0.495
R-Squared 0.020 0.111 0.172 0.005 0.010 0.025 0.007 0.018 0.025 0.023
Waves 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 4 1 - 4
Trim 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Employee FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Wave FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: See Table 2 notes. All regressions include employee fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects and a “Post” binary variable that equals one for all waves after the baseline. All variables
are trimmed at 1%. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors, clustered at employee level, reported in parentheses.
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Table A7: Long Term Effect of Defaults on M-Paz Balances by Quarter
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent Variable = M-Pazandaz Monthly Participation (=1)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q1 (During Study) 0.440*** 0.495*** 0.472*** 0.346***
(0.028) (0.039) (0.048) (0.046)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q2 (During Study) 0.330*** 0.366*** 0.374*** 0.234***
(0.031) (0.045) (0.053) (0.050)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q3 (Post Study) 0.077** 0.114* 0.047 0.064
(0.035) (0.059) (0.059) (0.062)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q4 (Post Study) 0.076** 0.108* 0.063 0.052
(0.038) (0.065) (0.064) (0.068)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q1 (Post Study) 0.083** 0.098 0.088 0.062
(0.039) (0.067) (0.066) (0.069)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q2 (Post Study) 0.075* 0.099 0.084 0.040
(0.039) (0.067) (0.067) (0.070)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q3 (Post Study) 0.070* 0.105 0.072 0.031
(0.040) (0.068) (0.067) (0.072)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q4 (Post Study) 0.049 0.066 0.055 0.027
(0.040) (0.068) (0.067) (0.071)
Employer Match Complete 0% 25% 50%
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Employee FE YES YES YES YES
# Employees 943 318 315 310
# Observations 15932 5297 5436 5199
R-Squared 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.11
Panel B. Dependent Variable = M-Pazandaz Monthly Balance (AFs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q1 (During Study) 1276.151*** 1451.145*** 1232.411*** 1149.819**
(243.711) (266.035) (426.033) (497.305)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q2 (During Study) 2181.255*** 2328.027*** 2548.884** 1676.520
(619.173) (558.224) (1103.583) (1289.838)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q3 (Post Study) 1101.753*** 437.328 1910.186** 854.693
(424.186) (319.477) (884.962) (830.137)
Defaulted In X 2015:Q4 (Post Study) 937.288* 62.507 2298.533*** 251.866
(508.617) (770.410) (883.006) (963.910)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q1 (Post Study) 291.542 -101.046 481.555 437.174
(542.742) (875.935) (801.500) (1129.017)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q2 (Post Study) 214.531 733.462 -103.568 1.781
(569.544) (1043.831) (909.243) (1035.179)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q3 (Post Study) 216.215 1122.238 -57.349 -427.992
(577.237) (1173.663) (905.239) (941.989)
Defaulted In X 2016:Q4 (Post Study) 689.448 1390.079 662.317 9.217
(660.593) (1254.212) (1112.137) (1078.826)
Employer Match Complete 0% 25% 50%
Month FE YES YES YES YES
Employee FE YES YES YES YES
# Employees 949 319 316 314
# Observations 17051 5672 5805 5574
R-Squared 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.07
Notes: Dependent variable in top panel is the monthly participation decision to contribute to the M-Pasandaz
account, and in the bottom panel is the M-Pasandaz balance at the end of each month (in Afghanis, or AFs). Each
observation is a respondent-month. All regressions include employee fixed effects and month fixed effects. *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors, clustered at employee level, reported in parentheses.
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Table A8: Default Effects on Savings Behaviors and Attitudes, by Match Rate
Outcome: Control Default Naive List et al Bonferonni
Mean Effect p-Value p-Value p-Value
Panel A: Composite Indices (0% Match)
Importance of Saving Index -0.143 0.259 0.003 0.006 0.007
Financial Security Index -0.007 0.118 0.080 0.147 0.235
Well-Being Index 0.091 0.021 0.727 0.732 1
Panel B: Composite Indices (25% Match)
Importance of Saving Index 0.056 0.003 0.966 0.966 1
Financial Security Index -0.002 0.110 0.120 0.297 0.347
Well-Being Index -0.018 0.038 0.557 0.801 1
Panel C: Composite Indices (50% Match)
Importance of Saving Index 0.071 0.147 0.044 0.103 0.112
Financial Security Index 0.022 0.091 0.190 0.332 0.566
Well-Being Index -0.032 0.004 0.949 0.946 1
Notes: See Table 4 notes.
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Table A9: “Top of the Mind” Treatments
Dependent Variable: Changed After Phone Survey (=1) Changed After SMS Reminder (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Phone Survey (=1) 0.006* -0.000 0.006
(0.004) (0.000) (0.006)
Default * Phone Survey 0.013*
(0.007)
25% Match * Phone Survey 0.007
(0.011)
50% Match * Phone Survey -0.006
(0.006)
SMS Reminder (=1) 0.026** 0.017 0.026
(0.010) (0.012) (0.018)
Default * SMS Reminder 0.018
(0.021)
25% Match * SMS Reminder -0.001
(0.025)
50% Match * SMS Reminder -0.000
(0.026)
Default In (=1) -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Match Rate = 25% 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Match Rate = 50% 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
# Observations 949 949 949 473 473 473
R-Squared 0.003 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.016 0.013
Notes: Changed After Phone Survey equals one if an employee changed their contribution rate either on the day they received a
phone survey or the day immediately following. Changed After SMS Reminder is a binary variable that equals one if an employee
changed their contribution rate either on the day they received a sms reminder or the day immediately following. Phone Survey
is a binary variable if the employee was randomly assigned to receive a phone survey. SMS Reminder is a binary variable if the
employee was randomly assigned to receive an sms reminder. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors reported
in parentheses.
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Table A10: Present Bias and Contribution Changes (Unincentivized Baseline Measure)
Dependent Variable: Still at Default on February 28 Still at Default and
No Withdrawal on Feb. 28
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Present Bias Parameter (β) -0.510*** -0.470*** -0.457*** -0.417**
(0.161) (0.168) (0.169) (0.177)
Cognitive Reflection Test (0-3) -0.051** -0.050**
(0.022) (0.022)
Risk Preference (1-10) 0.002 0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
Salary (1000 Afs) 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Tenure at Roshan (Years) -0.013** -0.009
(0.006) (0.006)
Male (=1) 0.026 0.034
(0.052) (0.052)
Education Level -0.001 -0.007
(0.017) (0.017)
Uses a Bank Account (=1) -0.042 -0.046
(0.037) (0.038)
Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday (=1) 0.009 0.007
(0.037) (0.037)
Capable of Fixing Phone (=1) 0.051 0.039
(0.035) (0.036)
Constant 1.075*** 1.078*** 0.977*** 0.989***
(0.156) (0.188) (0.164) (0.198)
R-Squared 0.010 0.025 0.008 0.020
# Employees 829 804 829 804
Notes: This table reports on the variables that predict whether a participant remains at their default election on February 28,
2015, two months after the start of the experiment. β is a measure of present bias obtained using a hypothetical price list at
baseline. The remaining variables are described in Appendix C.2. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses.
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Table A11: The Effect of Automatic Enrollment - Heterogeneity
Participates (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Default In (=1) 0.414*** 0.367*** 0.440*** 0.450*** 0.411*** 0.438*** 0.399*** 0.418*** 0.394*** 0.413*** 0.374*** 0.466**
(0.034) (0.046) (0.043) (0.063) (0.050) (0.072) (0.088) (0.135) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.190)
Default In x Present Biased 0.116* 0.115
(0.069) (0.071)
Default In x Cognitive Reflection Task -0.049 -0.038
(0.045) (0.050)
Default In x Risk Preference -0.008 -0.004
(0.011) (0.011)
Default In x Salary 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Default In x Tenure at Roshan -0.004 -0.010
(0.011) (0.013)
Default In x Male 0.013 -0.038
(0.096) (0.102)
Default In x Education Level -0.000 -0.018
(0.027) (0.032)
Default In x Uses a Bank Account 0.047 0.023
(0.070) (0.075)
Default In x Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday -0.000 0.034
(0.070) (0.074)
Default In x Capable of Fixing Phone 0.090 0.114
(0.069) (0.072)
Present Biased (=1) -0.081* -0.082*
(0.048) (0.048)
Cognitive Reflection Test (0-3) 0.052* 0.052
(0.032) (0.034)
Risk Preference (1-10) 0.004 0.003
(0.007) (0.007)
Salary 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Tenure at Roshan (Years) 0.003 0.002
(0.008) (0.009)
Male (=1) -0.107 -0.089
(0.074) (0.079)
Education Level -0.016 -0.024
(0.019) (0.024)
Uses a Bank Account 0.015 0.036
(0.049) (0.053)
Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday -0.038 -0.060
(0.048) (0.052)
Capable of Fixing Phone -0.015 -0.033
(0.048) (0.050)
Constant 0.276*** 0.308*** 0.247*** 0.257*** 0.262*** 0.256*** 0.367*** 0.350*** 0.270*** 0.291*** 0.283*** 0.467***
(0.024) (0.032) (0.029) (0.041) (0.038) (0.050) (0.069) (0.094) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.135)
# Observations 703 703 694 702 703 690 703 702 703 703 703 679
R-Squared 0.172 0.175 0.174 0.171 0.172 0.170 0.177 0.175 0.173 0.173 0.174 0.195
Notes: Participates (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if the contribution rate is greater than zero, and reflect values observed as of February 28, 2015, following the first two paydays but prior to the rollout of
phone surveys or secondary interventions. Present Biased (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if an employee is identified as having β < 1 in an experimental present bias elicitation completed at endline with real
stakes (see paper text for details). The additional covariates are: cognitive reflection task, risk preference, salary, tenure at Roshan, gender, education level, uses a bank account, withdraws entire salary on payday,
and capable of fixing a phone – see Appendix C.2 for questions. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table A12: Consultation Offer and Present Bias (Unincentivized Baseline Measure)
Accepted Consultation (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Consult Later 0.056 0.067 0.051 0.064 0.416*
(0.044) (0.045) (0.052) (0.053) (0.249)
Present Biased (=1) -0.027 -0.048 -0.055
(0.073) (0.074) (0.074)
Consult Later x Present Biased 0.021 0.018 0.032
(0.098) (0.100) (0.102)
Consult Later x Cognitive Reflection Test -0.022
(0.058)
Consult Later x Risk Preference 0.002
(0.016)
Consult Latex x Salary -0.003*
(0.002)
Consult Later x Tenure at Roshan -0.004
(0.017)
Consult Later x Male -0.209
(0.148)
Consult Later x Education Level -0.015
(0.042)
Consult Later x Uses a Bank Account 0.090
(0.096)
Consult Later x Withdraws Entire Salary on Payday -0.040
(0.096)
Consult Later x Capable of Fixing Phone -0.004
(0.097)
Constant 0.724*** 0.820*** 0.731*** 0.829*** 0.633***
(0.032) (0.120) (0.037) (0.122) (0.173)
Covariates No Yes No Yes Yes
# Observations 390 380 390 380 380
R-Squared 0.004 0.036 0.005 0.038 0.061
Notes: Accepted Consultation Offer (=1) is a binary variable that equals one if the employee agreed to participation in a financial
consultation regarding their participation in the M-Pasandaz program (see paper text for details). Consult Later (=1) is a binary
variable that equals zero if the employee was randomly assigned to receive a consultation on the same day as the consultation offer
was made, and equals one if the consultation was assigned to take place one week later. Present Biased (=1) is a binary variable
that equals one if an employee is identified as having β < 1 in an unincentivized present bias elicitation completed at baseline
(see paper text for details). Columns (2), (4) and (5) include covariates for cognitive reflection task, risk preference, salary, tenure
at Roshan, gender, education level, uses a bank account, withdraws entire salary on payday, and capable of fixing a phone – see
Appendix C.2 for questions. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table A13: Which Treatments Move Participants From Their Default Contribution?
Dependent Variable: Changed Contribution
After Feb. 28 (=1)
(1) (2) (3)
Financial Consultation (=1) 0.078*** 0.045 0.045
(0.025) (0.028) (0.042)
Financial Consultation x Still at Default 0.059
(0.047)
Financial Consultation x Defaulted In 0.155**
(0.079)
SMS Reminder (=1) 0.002 0.029 -0.016
(0.026) (0.033) (0.044)
SMS x Still at Default -0.045
(0.050)
SMS x Defaulted In 0.010
(0.083)
Still at Default (=1) 0.080**
(0.034)
Defaulted In (=1) 0.059
(0.058)
Constant 0.088*** 0.041** 0.096***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.033)
R-squared 0.013 0.039 0.065
# Employees 949 949 552
Sample Full Full Still
at Default
Notes: This table reports the comparative effectiveness of different treatments designed to
move participants from their default election. SMS Reminder is a dummy variable equal to
one for participants receiving an SMS reminder message, Consultation is dummy equal to
one for subjects receiving an offer of a financial consultation, Still at Default is a dummy
variable equal to one for participants who have not moved from their default election, and β
is a measure of present-bias obtained from a hypothetical price list experiment at baseline.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table A14: Which Element of the Consultation is Associated with Switching: Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable: Changed Contribution
After February 28 (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Assigned Consultation
Assigned Consultation (=1) 0.091*** -0.006 0.061*** 0.039
(0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.034)
Assigned Consultation x Still at Default 0.165*** 0.031
(0.027) (0.040)
Assigned Consultation x Defaulted In 0.060* -0.068**
(0.031) (0.034)
Assigned Consultation x Still at Default x Defaulted In 0.298***
(0.062)
Constant 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
R-squared 0.027 0.071 0.033 0.123
# Employees 927 927 927 927
Panel B: Accepted Consultation
Accepted Consultation (=1) 0.154*** 0.028 0.124*** 0.079*
(0.024) (0.022) (0.030) (0.043)
Accepted Consultation x Still at Default 0.214*** 0.066
(0.036) (0.054)
Accepted Consultation x Defaulted In 0.060 -0.084*
(0.042) (0.043)
Accepted Consultation x Still at Default x Defaulted In 0.312***
(0.078)
Constant 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
R-squared 0.040 0.112 0.046 0.165
# Employees 443 443 443 443
Panel C: Calculation Assistance
Calculation Assistance (=1) 0.439*** 0.143** 0.362*** 0.193**
(0.054) (0.071) (0.069) (0.095)
Calculation Assistance x Still at Default 0.447*** 0.277**
(0.092) (0.128)
Calculation Assistance x Defaulted In 0.178* -0.147
(0.102) (0.128)
Calculation Assistance x Still at Default x Defaulted In 0.399**
(0.174)
Constant 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
R-squared 0.278 0.373 0.294 0.398
# Employees 295 295 295 295
Notes : See Table 8 notes. This table reports which elements of the financial consultation predict whether an employee
switches their contribution. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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C Experimental Scripts
C.1 Financial Consultation
Hello XXX. I am calling on behalf of the M-Pasandaz research team department. I am calling
because you recently requested that a representative call you to provide you with additional
information about M-Pasandaz, and determine how to use M-Pasandaz in the way that is
best for you. This consultation will last roughly 5-10 minutes. Are you able to speak to me
now? [RECORD RESPONSE]
Thank you for taking the time to speak with me. As you know, M-Pasandaz is a new
benefit that is being offered to Roshan employees. In this call, you will have the opportunity
to ask questions about M-Pasandaz. I will provide information about how much savings you
would have for different levels of monthly contribution. At the end of the call, you will also
have the opportunity to change the level of your contribution if you would like.
First of all, would you like me to give you a brief overview of the M-Pasandaz account?
[YES/NO]
If YES: M-Pasandaz is a new benefit for all Roshan employees that was designed to help
increase your savings. It is a mobile savings account that is linked to your M-Paisa account. A
portion of your monthly salary - up to a maximum of 10% - can be automatically deposited
into your M-Pasandaz account each month. Participating in the M-Pasandaz account is
voluntary and you may receive benefits from Roshan to encourage you to save for the future.
You can access the money in your M-Pasandaz account at any time, but if you contribute
and dont make any withdrawals for 6 months, you may be eligible for a bonus from Roshan
as a reward for savings.
To begin, we would like to ask if there are any questions we might answer about M-
Pasandaz. [YES/NO]
Now, since every person has a different situation, I would like to explain several different
scenarios, to help you understand how different levels of M-Pasandaz contributions would
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work for you. According to our records, you are in the [WHITE/BLUE/RED] plan, and you
currently have a monthly contribution rate of [XX%]. Were you aware that this was your
plan and contribution rate? [YES/NO]
According to our records, you have a monthly salary of XXX. Since you are in the
[WHITE/BLUE/RED] plan, you are eligible to receive a matching contribution Roshan of
[0/25/50] percent for all money that you save in your M-Pasandaz account. Our records also
show that you [HAVE/HAVE NOT] made a withdrawal from your M-Pasandaz account,
meaning that you [ARE NOT/ARE] still eligible to receive your matching contribution.
Therefore, if you continue to contribute at your current rate and make no withdrawals, at
the end of the trial period in July, you would have a total value of MMM in your M-Pasandaz
account. This reflects both your contribution and the contribution of Roshan to the account
on your behalf. Would you like me to repeat this information for you? [YES/NO]
Thank you. Of course, you are always free to change your monthly contribution rate.
If you like, I can explain to you exactly what would happen if you decided to change your
match to a different amount. Would you like me assist you by explaining what would happen
if you changed your contribution rate to a different amount? [YES/NO]
If YES: What scenario would you like me to explain? The contribution rate can be
anywhere between 0% and 10% of your monthly salary. [RECORD ANSWER]
Do you have any additional questions about how M-Pasandaz works, or can I provide
any additional information that can help you determine how to use M-Pasandaz in the way
that is best for you? [YES/NO]
Thank you. Now, I would like to offer you the opportunity to change your contribu-
tion rate. If you wish, you can tell me your preferred rate, and I will change it for you.
Alternatively, you always have the opportunity to call HR at a later date and change the
contribution. Would you like me to change your contribution rate? [YES/NO]
If YES: What would you like your new rate to be: [RECORD RESPONSE]
Thank you very much for your time. Goodbye.
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C.2 Survey instrument (selected questions)
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Endline survey questions (savings behavior, financial security, and wellbeing) 
 
Roshan leadership is reviewing the results of the M-Pasandaz pilot program, and will be making a 
decision in the next few months about its future. In the meantime, we would like to offer you the 
opportunity to continue to have a portion of your salary deposited automatically in the M-
Pasandaz account each month. For deposits made starting in August there will be no matching 
incentive paid, but you are welcome to continue to have part of your salary deducted and placed 
in savings if you find this useful. For these deposits, you will be free to make withdrawals at any 
time without penalty. 
 
 
 
Would you enroll now to have part of your salary deposited each month starting in 
August?  
1 Yes             98 Don’t Know           
2 No            99 Refuse to Answer         
  
  
 
How important do you think savings is - extremely important, very important, somewhat 
important, not very important, not at all important? 
1 Extremely important     4 Not very important        
2 Very important 
   5 Not at all important     
3 Somewhat important                         
 
 
 Do you attempt to save money each month? 
1 Yes           98 Don’t Know         
2 No                 98 Refuse to Answer       
 
 
 
If "1" means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, and "10" means you are 
completely satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household's 
financial situation? 
|___|___|  
99 Refuse to Answer                 
 
 
 
On a scale of 1-10, how satisfied are you personally with the financial situation of your 
household?  
|___|___|  
99 Refuse to Answer                 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
How confident do you feel that you will be able to meet your financial obligations (pay 
your bills, buy food/clothes) during the coming month: Highly confident, somewhat 
confident, Somewhat not confident, Not confident at all?  
1 Highly 
confident       3 Some What not confident 
 
  
  
        
2 Somewhat 
confident     4 Not confident at all       
 
 
 
How confident do you feel that you will be able to meet your financial obligations 1 year 
from now: Highly confident, somewhat confident, Somewhat not confident, Not confident at 
all?  
1 Highly confident  3 Some What not confident              
2 Somewhat confident 4 Not confident at all       
 
 
 
Do you feel that you will be able to someday retire, stop working, and live off of your 
accumulated savings? 
1 Yes              2 No               
 
 
 
What prevents you from saving? (not important, too many expenses, benefits are too small, 
no place to save, etc) 
1 Not important   3 Benefits too small 
2 Too many expenses     4 No place to save  
5 Other (Specify)  
 
 
 
During the last seven days how many times did one or more people in your household not 
receive a regular daily meal? 
|___|___| Times 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Taking all things together, do you think you are, Very happy, Somewhat happy, little 
happy or Not at all Happy: 
1 Very happy      3 little happy           
2 Somewhat happy   4 Not at all happy  
99 Refuse to Answer         
 
 
 
All things considered, how satisfied are you with life as a whole? Please tell me your answer 
on a 10 point scale, where 1 represents Most Dissatisfied, 10 represents Most Satisfied." 
10 point scale: 10=Satisfied; 1=Dissatisfied  
|___|___|  
99 Refuse to Answer                 
 
 
 
All in all, how would you describe your state of physical health these days? Would you say 
it is…? 
1 Very good         4 Poor               
2 Good       98 Don’t Know    
3 Fair                                 
 
 
 
Over the past 3 months were you unable to perform normal activities for at least 7 days due 
to an illness/injury? 
1 Yes              2 No              
 
 
 Has your participation in M-Pasandaz changed your desire to save? 
1 Yes             98 Don’t Know           
2 No               99 Refuse to Answer         
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Baseline survey questions (intelligence, risk, preferences) 
 
 
 
If it takes five machines five minutes to make five widgets, how long does it take 100 machines 
to make 100 widgets? 
|___|___| Min 
98 Don’t Know             99 Refuse to Answer             
                   
 
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for 
the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
|___|___| Days 
98 Don’t Know             99 Refuse to Answer             
                   
 
Suppose Ahmad earns a salary of 1000 dollars a month.  He obtains a ten percent raise this year 
and a ten percent raise next year.  How much exactly will his income be after the second raise? 
|___|___|___|___| 
98 Don’t Know               99 Refuse to Answer             
 
 
There are many decisions we make in life that could lead to a range of outcomes.  For example, when we 
make a business investment, we are not sure that the business will be successful.  This phenomenon is 
called risk. Many decisions involve risk. For example, if you decide to sell a new type of product or service, 
how much profit will you earn? We are interested in understanding more about how business owners think 
about risk. 
 
 
How do you see yourself - are you in general a person who takes risk or do you try to avoid 
risks? Please self-grade your choice (ranging between 0-10), where 0 represents "not at all 
prepared to take risk" and 10 represents extremely prepared to take risk. 
|___|___| 
 
     How many bank accounts do you personally do you have? |___| 
98 Don't Know             99 Refuse to Answer 
  
 
If you had a technical problem with your cell phone, who would you mainly ask for help? (for 
example if your phone would not turn on or allow you to make calles) 
1 I can fix it myself       4 Cell phone retailer/repair shop   
2 A relative      
5 I would purchase a new phone 
3 A neighbor or friend     
6 Other (Specify)   
 
 
 
Do you withdraw your entire salary each month after you are paid, or do you leave a fraction 
on M-paisa? 
1 Withdraw entire monthly salary         
2 Leave some fraction on as an M-paisa balance 
 
 
C.3 Present Bias Elicitation
Below, we provide the survey instrument used to elicit the present bias parameter used in
the regression in Table 5. This instrument is a modified version of the time-dated price
list method proposed by Andreoni et al. (2015), where payments were made using M-Paisa
(mobile money). In our case, the incentivized measure leverages the fact that employees had
received their salaries using mobile money for several years, and therefore had a high degree
of confidence that they would receive their payments.
As noted in the text, however, this measure may my fungible to respondents (Cubitt
and Read, 2007; Chabris et al., 2008; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Augenblick et al., 2015;
Carvalho et al., 2014; Andreoni et al., 2016). In addition, we lack endline inconsistency
measures for 175 employees, or 18.4% of our sample. Of these, 131 (13.8% of sample) did
not complete an endline survey - primarily due to leaving Roshan before the end of the
experiment. The remaining 44 employees (4.6% of sample) completed endline surveys but
did not complete the inconsistency elicitation.
For this reason, we also separately estimate the regressions in Table 5 using a different
measure of present bias, elicited at baseline. In this protocol, subjects were asked: “Suppose
someone was going to pay you USD 450 in one month. He/she offers to pay you a lower
amount today. What amount today would make you just as happy as receiving USD 450 in
one month?” and “Suppose someone was going to pay you USD 450 in 13 months. He/she
offers to pay you a lower amount in 12 months time. What amount in 12 months would make
you just as happy as receiving USD 450 in 13 months?” We identify someone as present-
biased if the response to the first question is a lower amount than the response to the second
question.
Results using this measure of present bias are reported in Table A10, and are qualitatively
similar to those in the main text. All employees in our sample completed a baseline survey
but 53 employees (5.5% of sample) did not complete the baseline elicitation.
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Payment 
TODAY
AFN 250 AFN 125 AFN 0
and  
payment in 4 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
Payment 
TODAY
AFN 225 AFN 113 AFN 0
and  
payment in 4 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
Payment 
TODAY
AFN 200 AFN 100 AFN 0
and  
payment in 4 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
Payment 
TODAY
AFN 175 AFN 88 AFN 0
and  
payment in 4 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
Payment 
TODAY
AFN 150 AFN 75 AFN 0
and  
payment in 4 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
   2. Would 
you like to 
receive
   3. Would 
you like to 
receive
   4. Would 
you like to 
receive
   5. Would 
you like to 
receive
TODAY and 4 WEEKS from today
WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 1 AND 6?
For each decision number (1 to 5) below, decide the AMOUNTS you would like for sure today AND 
in 4 weeks by checking the corresponding box.
Example: In Decision 1, if you wanted AFN 250 today and AFN 0 in four weeks you would check the 
left-most box. Remember to check only one box per decision!
   1. Would 
you like to 
receive
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payment in 4 
WEEKS…
AFN 250 AFN 125 AFN 0
and  
payment in 8 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
payment in 4 
WEEKS…
AFN 225 AFN 113 AFN 0
and  
payment in 8 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
payment in 4 
WEEKS…
AFN 200 AFN 100 AFN 0
and  
payment in 8 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
payment in 4 
WEEKS…
AFN 175 AFN 88 AFN 0
and  
payment in 8 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
payment in 4 
WEEKS…
AFN 150 AFN 75 AFN 0
and  
payment in 8 
WEEKS
AFN 0 AFN 125 AFN 250
c c c
   9. Would 
you like to 
receive
   10. Would 
you like to 
receive
4 WEEKS and  8 WEEKS from today
WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 1 AND 6?
For each decision number (6 to 10) below, decide the AMOUNTS you would like for sure in 4 weeks 
AND in 8 weeks by checking the corresponding box.
Example:  In Decision 6, if you wanted AFN 250 in four weeks and AFN 0 in eight weeks you would 
check the left-most box. Remember to check only one box per decision!
   6. Would 
you like to 
receive
   7. Would 
you like to 
receive
   8. Would 
you like to 
receive
99
